HINDAWI BOOK ON COLLAPSE OF SADDAM REGIME - hussain hindawi

ARTICLES

In the Levant:

Persuading Saddam to go.
Arab view of Castro.
Iran woos the Bush Administration.
Russia promised Iraqi oil.
Mauritania’s ties with Israel.
A new diplomatic success for Iran.
Yemen hopes for a future prosperity
‘Shoe Bomber’ controversy.
Iraqi Kurds give up idea of independence.
Saddam and Chirac: A 30 Years Relationship.
No big news expected from summit
Libya’s love affair with Africa
Baath mass graves litter Iraq
Lawlessness and Iraq’s future
Iraqi army no pushover.
Post-Saddam Iraq as murky as present.
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s resignation.
Iraqi opposition still divided.
Sept. 11: Backlash for Islamic militants
Give Muslims their due.
Iraqi dinar rises amid smuggling scandals
Bahrain and the democracy dream.
Saudi prince has political ambitions in Lebanon.
Iraq would have preferred Gore.
Saddam needs better diplomats.

(1)

In the Levant: Persuading Saddam to go

By HUSSAIN HINDAWI

LONDON, Jan. 10 (UPI) — Arab voices are for the first time openly calling for Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s resignation and his departure from Iraq to prevent what could be catastrophic U.S. military action against his people. The issue has become a topic of debate in the Arab press, especially in the Arab Gulf states.

This week, a group of Arab intellectuals, writers and lawyers in Europe published a statement saying Saddam should “resign immediately” and calling on the Arab world to exert every possible effort to remove Saddam and his collaborators from power so as to avert war. The writers also called for the appointment of international human rights observers in Iraq to monitor the transition to a democratic government.

The proposal, dismissed as mere fantasy a month ago when it was first proposed by former Lebanese politician and the publisher of al-Nahar daily, Ghassan Tweini, has begun to attract serious and widespread Arab attention.

In an open letter to the Iraqi president, Tweini proposed that he should quit in return for asylum in another country.

The call for Saddam’s resignation is not exactly new. It first surfaced after the collapse of the Iraqi army before the end of the 1991 Gulf War. For a while, French intelligence even claimed that Saddam had moved to Algeria.

But he stayed on in Baghdad, consolidating his position by purging a number of high officials and replacing them with trusted collaborators.

These days, Arab newspapers have been filled with “leaks” from Arab and Western diplomatic and intelligence sources, quoting Iraqi officials as saying that Saddam would refuse to receive any Arab delegation, at any level, that came to Baghdad to ask him to quit his post, or even to discuss the issue with him. Press reports say he would even refuse if the decision were taken in an Arab summit convened for the purpose.

Arab sources said a delegation from a Cairo-based organization called the Egyptian Committee for Solidarity with the Iraqi and Palestinian People was heading for Baghdad in an effort to persuade the Iraqis to form a “national salvation” government.

Sources in the group, which includes former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark and former Algerian president Ahmad Benbella, said the new government would include Iraqi opposition groups and would remove the tough restrictions imposed on the Iraqi press.

More significant was the slowly mounting pressure from some Arab governments to find a way out of the crisis. Well-connected Arab sources said they expected a change in Egyptian policy towards Iraq, and Iraqi opposition figures would soon be received in Cairo.

The sources credited British Prime Minister Tony Blair with convincing Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on the need for a regime change in Iraq while the Blair family was on vacation in Egypt last fall. They said they expected high-level Egyptian officials to lead an Arab initiative to pressure Saddam to resign and leave the country with his family and close collaborators. Saddam would be offered asylum in another Arab country.

Meanwhile, semi-official Arab sources said Saudi Arabia has told Washington it will make a last effort to find a diplomatic solution to the Iraqi crisis if the U.N. arms inspectors showed in their upcoming report on Jan. 27 that they could find no evidence that Iraq was building and storing weapons of mass destruction.

So far — the sources said — efforts connected with the idea of Saddam abandoning his post have been conducted “from a distance.” However, some Arab officials believe there could be an extraordinary Arab summit held in Baghdad, in which Saddam would surprise the other Arab leaders by announcing his resignation.

The possibility of Saddam resigning has not received the same attention in the United States and the West and preparations for war are gaining momentum. But Arab commentators make the point that Washington has not delegated anyone to explore this possibility either with Arab governments or directly with Iraq.

Arab talk about unseating Saddam, however, reflects a growing desire among Arab governments to resolve the crisis for themselves, without a U.S.-led intervention.

Some Iranian government officials have also joined in voicing their expectations regarding the issue. Sources close to the decision-makers in the capital, Tehran, said Friday that Russian President Vladimir Putin was mediating to persuade Saddam to resign, but there was no confirmation of this from Moscow sources. They said that German foreign minister Joska Fischer had told his Iranian counterpart in a telephone conversation that Washington was seeking a “bloodless coup” with the help of the Russian president.

They also claimed that Russian Arabist and former Prime Minister Yvgeny Primakov was arranging a visit by Putin to Baghdad to convince the Iraqi president to abandon his position and to take him to Moscow.

Meanwhile, speculation and rumors continue as to the country Saddam would choose for his exile. While some believed he would go to an Arab country, especially Egypt, Algeria or Libya, others mentioned Cuba, North Korea, and Belarus.

Iraqi Trade Minister Mohammad Mehdi Saleh last week insisted that the Baghdad regime would put up a fierce fight against an American attack in the coming months, “more fierce than during the 1991 Gulf war.” He said that the Gulf War “revolved around whether or not to withdraw from Kuwait. Now, the issue is whether or not to abandon our land, and this we will fight for.”

Many Arabs give little credence to the idea that Saddam or any other Arab ruler would go voluntarily, although the region has witnessed a number of departures from power in the past 50 years.

Saudi Arabia’s King Saud was expelled from his country in 1955, Yemeni President Abdallah Salal was overthrown in 1966, and the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, fled his country a few weeks before the victory of the Islamic revolution in his country in 1979.

The Iraqi Baath Party itself has a precedent when Saddam announced in 1979 the “resignation” of his predecessor, Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, “for the service of the nation and cause.” This was regarded as an internal military coup, especially after the authorities in Baghdad declared the “mysterious” death of Bakr a few weeks later.

The Iraqi opposition is divided into two camps regarding the future of Saddam. One camp, which includes many members who served Saddam at one point, say Saddam would prefer death to such a solution. They say the Iraqi president could not accept a defeat. The familiar remark that “Saddam reserves the last bullet in his pistol for himself,” however, is widely regarded as naive.

The other opposition camp expects Saddam would not hesitate to make a concession to cling to power, no matter how humiliating, if he found himself forced to do so. He has made such humiliating concessions to Iran in 1975, and to the United States when he accepted the cease-fire terms of the 1991 Gulf War.

(Hussain Hindawi is the editor of United Press International’s London-based Arab News Service. “In the Levant” is published in English and in Arab media. Its views are not necessarily those of UPI.)

—

Copyright 2003 by United Press International.

All rights reserved.

(2)

In the Levant: Arab view of Castro
By HUSSAIN HINDAWI

LONDON, May 18 (UPI) — For significant reasons, Cuban President Fidel
Castro was welcomed in Arab countries he visited in his recent 11-day tour
for many reason, widely described in the region as “historic.”

First, he is admired as a durable revolutionary leader, who has
consistently supported Third World countries, and especially Arab people.
Second, he gets high marks for standing up to what his hosts see as more
than three decades of U.S. pressure.

Why then did his tour of Libya, Algeria, Malaysia, Iran, Qatar and Syria
at the head of a 200-member delegation generate so little enthusiasm among
the general public?

To Arabs, Castro is a figure from another age. Deeply respected by most
Arabs and Muslims, he belongs to the same generation of liberators as
Egyptian Gamel Abdel Nasser, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Patrice Lumumba of
the Congo.

However, “Castroism” has reached old age as a group of vague concepts and
government slogans with little relevance to countries suffering from
economic crises and living on the margin of world developments.

During his visit, Castro’s revolutionary pronouncements against U.S.
policies, globalization and the International Monetary Fund went down well
with his hosts, but did not disguise the main purpose of the Cuban leader’s
trip, which was to strengthen relations with oil-producing countries willing
to trade cheap oil for Cuba’s sugar production, formerly a mainstay Cuban
export to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

His tour was also aimed at refuting U.S. claims that Cuba has been
isolated in the international community through visiting some countries from
Washington’s list of “rogue states” because of their support of militancy
and violations of human rights.

In Iran, the joint final communique released after Castro’s meeting with Iranian President Mohammed Khatami condemned “U.S. terrorism,” while Iran’s
spiritual leader Ali Khamenei said Iran and Cuba “do not fear the United
States, and both reject its attempts to impose its control on the world.”

Castro’s pragmatic objective in seeking trading partners was most evident
when he visited Qatar — the only country in his tour considered a U.S.
ally. Even here, the Cuban leader did not hesitate to take a swipe at U.S.
officials, although he singled out Secretary of State Colin Powell for
special praise as a man “able to communicate and who is not thirsty for
power.”

But the Arab public evidently found it hard to match the 74-year-old
leader and his reputation. His outdated speeches had nothing to do with the
young, courageous revolutionary commanding Cuban guerrillas in the Sierra
Maestra who successfully occupied Havana and overthrew the regime of Cuban
dictator Fulgencio Batista on January 3, 1959.

After all, this famous revolutionary leader failed to fulfill his promise
of establishing justice and freedom.

Among younger Arabs, the argument that U.S. military and economic pressure
was responsible for Castro’s monolithic hold on power has worn a bit thin.
The visit also revealed that Cuba’s relations with leftist and liberation
movements has declined, and the one-time revolutionary hero is now closer to
such totalitarian regimes as Libya and Iran.

Arabs under 40 know little about the Cuban Revolution and almost nothing
of “Castroism.” The “Castroist” ideology, has lost its attraction in the
Middle East, and the interest of many political writers has shifted to the
democratic experiences in Latin American countries that can be applied in
Arab states. These writers see a resemblance between the Middle Eastern and
Latin American countries — except in the case of Cuba.

Castro, as his tour showed, had nothing “revolutionary” to propose except
for anti-American denunciations, and some vague proposals to confront
attempts “to impose siege and pressure on Third World countries,” which he
described as “economic pressures against independent countries through an
imposed embargo that contradicts human values.” He also denounced “hegemony
through a new unilateral world order.”

In Malaysia, where Castro called for more “rebellions” in the world,
considering Cuba as the “rebel of the West” and Malaysia as the “rebel of
the East.” He also said globalization destroyed national sovereignty and
called for granting equality to the Third World and reforming the United
Nations.

The same happened in Syria, where he was described as “the revolutionary
leader who smashed the bloom of imperialism” — words that have no meaning
in the Arabic language.

Thirty years ago, such a tour could have been an unforgettable event. But
with the exception of some possible economic and political gains, and the
renewal of already-strong Arab and Islamic sympathy towards the Cuban
people, Castro’s tour is not expected to produce major practical results.

While all people of the countries Castro visited are united in opposition
to what they perceive as U.S. support of Israeli arrogance, economic
progress, freedom and building a future are their primary national aims.
Since Castro’s speeches appeared to address sentiments rather than concrete
ideas, he was widely seen as a conservative attracted by the past while
these nations are now looking to the future.

(Hussain Hindawi is the editor of United Press International’s Arab News
Service. His column is published in both the Arab media and in English. The
views expressed are his own and not necessarily those of UPI.)

—
Copyright 2001 by United Press International.
All rights reserved.
—

(3)

From the Levant:
Iran woos the Bush Administration
By HUSSAIN HINDAWI
LONDON, Dec. 28 (UPI) — As soon as George W. Bush was confirmed winner of the U.S. Presidential elections Iran was quick to renew its invitation to Washington to open a new page of not just positive but special ties. So the ball is already in the new Administration’s court.
The invitation came from Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi, the same pragmatic minister who last February had already called on Washington to begin practical steps towards normalization.
The U.S. response in February call was no quicker than to earlier ones from Tehran. Shortly afterwards, however, the embargo was lifted on food products, medicines and medical equipment.
President Clinton’s decision, taken in the middle of last year, also applied to the embargo against Libya and Sudan. Tehran now expects several more changes in the U.S. position towards Iran. The Iranians are betting on the impact of huge joint interests, and on the pressure exerted by the oil companies.
Even so, they expect changes to be relatively minor and gradual.
The Bush Administration is neither in a position, nor necessarily in a hurry to make major changes, such as removing the Persian state from its list of countries supporting international terrorism and developing nuclear and chemical weapons, as well as long-range missiles. That’s why Kharrazi hinted that his country also was not in a hurry, and was prepared to wait until Bush makes his approach.
But Kharrazi made the point that “Iran will change its policies if the U.S. does the same.” At the same time Iran has sent signals to U.S. corporations that Tehran was concerned about their interests, but expected Washington to take into consideration Iran’s regional interests.
Iranian President Mohammed Khatami’s recent visit to Tokyo reportedly resulted in a Japanese commitment to try to persuade Washington to change its hostile policies towards Iran. Iran wants Washington to show it is “honestly” seeking to re-establish ties through possible “tangible
Steps,” such as releasing Iran’s assets frozen in U.S. banks for more than 20 years, easing restrictions imposed on trade and investment., and allowing Iran to obtain advanced technologies even in a limited way.
Iran’s powerful spiritual guide Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has been a stumbling block to opening any dialogue with Washington, arguing that restoring U.S. – Iranian ties would be a “deviation from the revolution’s genuine line.
But Tehran believes it has received encouraging early signals from the Bush administration. Tehran feels that the Republican President-as Clinton did in the last two years of his presidency-will take note of the slow but significant improvement in the U.S. public perception of Iran.
President Bush was also expected to take into account the growing interest of American firms to return to the Iranian market. Oil firms would like to see the 1996 Damato Law, which bans investments in Iran’s oil and gas sectors, cancelled or at least not renewed when it expires on August 2001.
Finally, Iran believes that the Bush Administration will be relatively better than the Democrats on Palestinian rights, particularly since the majority of U.S. Arabs and Muslims voted for George W. Bush.
Kharrazi is known to believe that the Palestinian Intifada was – as he has said-one of the “reasons that led to the defeat of the Democrats because of their excessive support of Israel and the support of the Jewish lobby for them.”
Iran moreover is not afraid of retired Gen. Colin Powell’s appointment as Secretary of State. As a strategist with a good knowledge of the Gulf region Powell will be interested in developing U.S.-Iranian strategic ties as they were before the Islamic Revolution of 1979.
Kharrazi is taking a personal risk in favoring improved relations with the United States. Iranian conservatives, who still completely control the judiciary and enjoy strong support of the military and security institutions, have succeeded in the past in removing a number of the reformist
leaders on charges of propagating normalization with the United States. Minister of Culture Atallah Mohajrani was forced to resign for making the same proposals, and former Interior Minister Abdallah Nouri has been jailed on similar charges.
Saeed Korrasani, Iran’s former representative to the UN, believes that there will be no changes in the political relations between the two countries unless Tehran takes the first step. “Bush represents one sector of the U.S. economy, and many businessmen wish to invest their money in Middle East oil,” he said, “but they are sensitive regarding issues such as security in the Gulf-and especially how to cooperate with Iran especially regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict.”
Ironically, the hard liners may put up less resistance now for internal political reasons. U.S.-Iranian ties are likely to be a major issue in the coming Iranian presidential elections. President Khatami is expected to win a second term. However, normalization can still stir emotions in Iran-and might be a valuable campaign weapon for the hardliners.

(Hussein Hindawi is the director of the London-based Arab News Service of UPI. His column appears weekly in English- and Arabic-language media. The views expressed are not necessarily those of United Press International. )
—
Copyright 2000 by United Press International.
All rights reserved.
—

(4)

In the Levant: Russia promised Iraqi oil

By HUSSAIN HINDAWI

LONDON, July 10 (UPI) — Iraq has been full of praise for Moscow lately,
following Russia’s use of its veto to delay the U.N. Security Council vote
on new anti-Iraqi sanctions. Baghdad also has promised Russia oil deals at
generous terms.

But caution prevails, despite talk of secret pledges by Baghdad to Moscow on
one hand, and Russia’s eagerness to regain some of its lost influence in the
Arab world on the other.

Iraq expected Russia to offer amendments to the smart sanctions cobbled
together by Britain and the United States, and this feeling grew following
the successful Bush-Putin summit in Slovenia.

The Babel Newspaper, edited by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s eldest son
Uday, said last week it expected the U.N. Security Council to agree on “an
alternative solution that includes elements acceptable to all the Security
Council permanent members, especially France, in return for relinquishing
other points that would be opposed by Russia and China.”

The view in Baghdad was that Moscow would threaten to use its veto against
the smart sanctions as a tactical measure to exert pressure on Washington
over such issues as missile defense, and European security, and then propose
new sanctions months later.

Iraq accused France of betraying the Iraqi-French friendship, and threatened
to cut off oil supplies, but Iraqi official media remained silent over
China’s approval of the smart sanctions. The new sanctions are aimed at
tightening control of military equipment while easing restictions on food
and medical supplies paid for from Iraqi oil revenues controlled by the
United Nations.

But to the delight of Baghdad, Russia refused the smart sanctions and called
for a total lifting of U.N.-imposed sanctions.

Weeks ago, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tarik Aziz disclosed that his
government had asked Russia to exercise its veto in the Security Council to
block the smart sanctions project in exchange for continued Russian
participation in Iraqi oil projects.

Knowing that promises by its former client were no guarantee of delivery,
Moscow apparently sought and obtained personal guarantees from Saddam
Hussein.

In earlier disputes between the Iraqi government and Russia, the Iraqis had
accused Russian companies of delays implementing an accord to develop two of
Iraq’s biggest oil fields in its southern region. The main Iraqi complaint
involved the giant West Qurna oil field, which has an estimated reserve of
one billion tons of crude oil. In March 1997, Iraq signed a23-year $3.5
billion deal with a Russian oil consortium led by Lukoil. The Russians were
supposed to deliver 600,000 barrels a day, but failed to live up to the
deal. Baghdad also complained that the Russians had failed to deliver on
other oil and gas projects, mainly the Lauhees field and developing Iraqi
oil refineries.

Other areas of dispute between Moscow and Baghdad were rooted in the past.
In 1979, Saddam Hussein turned against the Iraqi Communist Party, formerly
his allies. Hundreds of communist members were tortured and executed and
many others were forced to flee the country.

It was the signing of the Iraqi-Soviet Friendship Treaty in 1973 that opened
the way for the massive arms deliveries that Iraq received from the former
Soviet Union in exchange for important oil privileges.

Moreover, Saddam’s son, Uday, recently handed the Iraqi parliament a
strong-worded memorandum accusing Russian firms of being “fronts for U.S.and
British companies which are being financed by Jewish and Zionist businessmen
and using materials imported from Israel.”

According to official statistics, Russian firms alone have won contracts
worth $2.5 billion under the U.N. oil-for-food program. But Russia claims
that it has suffered losses up to $30 billion as a result of the sanctions
imposed on Iraq since 1990.

As a result Iraq wants Russia to benefit under Article 50 of the U.N.Charter
allowing countries that have been adversely affected by the embargo to
establish normal trade relations with the country under an economic siegeand
be exempted from the embargo.

The reality is that Saddam prefers to do business with western companies,
especially the U.S. corporations. That way he is in a better position to
influence U.S. political decisions. It’s equally true that U.S. corporations
reciprocate this interest. As a prominent Russian oil official said, “the
United States is waiting for Russian companies to withdraw from Iraq. As
soon as this happens, the sanctions will be lifted and the U.S. companies
will reappear.”

No Arab state is willing to give back to Moscow the power it exerted in the
Middle East as the Soviet Union. Moreover, Russian President Vladimir Putin,
with his cold and evasive eyes, is far away from winning the admiration of
Arab leaders.

More importantly, the smart sanctions project is gaining increased
acceptance in various sectors in the Arab world — especially among the
Iraqi people — because it proposes to shift the emphasis of the embargo
from Iraqi civilians and focus it on the regime and its repressive bodies.

After 33 years of family rule, Saddam’s regime hardly enjoys popular support
in any region of the Arab world. This is a truth that equals the truth that
Arabs also have lost confidence in U.S. and British intentions regarding the
future of Iraq in the wake of the great damage inflicted on the Iraqi
people, as they confront the current problems of the Middle East conflict —
conditioned by the United States’s continued bias in favor of Israel.

(Hussain Hindawi is the editor of United Press International’s London-based
Arab News Service. “In the Levant” is published in English and in Arab
media. Its views are not necessarily those of UPI.)–

(5)

In the Levant:

Mauritania’s ties with Israel

By HUSAIN HINDAWI

LONDON, May 30 (UPI) — When Mauritania’s Foreign Minister Dah Ould Abdi visited

Israel last week he got a mild welcome from the Israeli government, and a lot of
flak from
Arab countries, particularly the Palestinians. The new Arab League
Secretary-General Amr
Mousa said the visit violated “Arab consensus.”

Mauritania’s response was to criticize the Arab League’s “double-standard” and
what it called
“selective Arab consensus.” Its government pointed out that Mauritania was not
the only Arab
country to have diplomatic relations with Israel at the ambassadorial level, but
number three
after Egypt and Jordan.

Mauritania also argued that it was not the only Arab country to have direct
trade ties with
Israel without a peace accord. Qatar, headquarters of the Organization of the
Islamic
Conference, also hosts an Israeli trade office with the complete “understanding
of all Arab
and Islamic countries.”

Mauritania established full diplomatic ties with Israel in October 1999, and has
repeatedly
refused to go along with OIC and other calls for reducing, freezing or severing
ties with the
Jewish state. Moreover, Mauritanian President Maaouiya Ould Taya has for years
avoided
attending any of the Arab summits out of fear of violent Arab criticism of his
pro-Israeli
policies.

Israel showed understandable satisfaction over Ould Abdi’s visit and its timing,
but certainly
did not overestimate its practical value. The Israelis are as aware as anybody
that Mauritania
has limited influence in any of the Arab regional blocs, and virtually none with
any of the
parties to the Middle East conflict.

So it was ironic to find Mauritania’s Information Minister saying that Ould
Abdi’s visit was
intended to tell the Israelis that his government will not “stand idle” if the
violent suppression
of Palestinian demonstrations persisted. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon,
for his part, said
that his country was “very happy” to receive the Nouakchott’s envoy as the visit
“shows a
courageous commitment on the part of Mauritania towards achieving peace in the
region.”
The ties with Israel have created internal problems. Mauritanian opposition
parties have
condemned Ould Abdi’s visit as “dangerous” for it “distorted the image of
Mauritania.” But
the opposition parties, especially the Islamic ones whose followers have been
recently
subjected to arrest campaigns, have clearly targeted the Mauritanian president
since the
beginning by demanding to end normalization with Israel.

The opposition parties also condemned the “silence” of the state-run media on
the Palestinian
Intifada, accusing the government of preparing Mauritania to “become a base for
the Mossad
(Israeli intelligence service) and keeping the country’s doors wide open for
Israeli spies under
the cover of Israeli medical and parliamentary delegations.”

Behind Ould Abdi’s visit was an attempt by President Ould Taya to reduce the
dangers —
internal and foreign — facing his regime on the one hand, and Nouakchott’s
determination not
to remain a poor and remote spot on the map of the Arab world. Such a wish was
repeatedly
expressed in the past when Mauritania became the first Maghreb state to
normalize ties with
Israel. Prior to that it had formed an alliance with Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein — and
supported Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War — before turning against Saddam to
improve its ties
with the United States. Mauritania believes that its ties with Israel would
ensure the support
both of Israel and the United States. Israel has in fact offered financial
assistance to
Mauritania during the past two years.

President Ould Taya, an Army general who has been in power since 1984, has been
assiduous
in trying to win the confidence of the United States, and strengthen military
ties; and
Washington is aware of Mauritania’s importance. Moreover, U.S.-Mauritanian
economic ties
have improved since Mauritania normalized ties with Israel. For example the U.S.
company
Breek Capital Corporation was granted three licences for diamond exploration in
the country’s
northern areas.

Mauritanian opposition sources say that under a security agreement between
Nouakchott and
Washington, Mauritanian security forces have been monitoring the movements of —
and in
some instances arresting — Islamic extremists suspected of being linked to
Saudi dissident
Ossama bin Laden and to the wide-spread “Daawa” Islamic extremist group.

Under U.S. influence Mauritania abandoned it old strategic friendship with
France, and two
years ago the United States also exerted pressure on the Mauritanian government
to sever its
strategic ties with Iraq. According to Baghdad, such a move came “to implement
orders by
Washington and Tel Aviv.”

Iraqi-Mauritanian ties have been unstable since the Mauritanian Army came to
power in 1968.
Former President Khouna Ould Hidala accused Iraq in 1972 of arranging a coup
d’etat to be
carried out by a number of Army officers from the Talia (Vanguard) Party (the
Iraqi Baath
wing) who were trained in Baghdad.

But the alliance with Iraq was revived when Baghdad backed Mauritania in its
armed struggle
against Senegal in 1989 and supplied it with important weapons and military
equipment. In
return, Mauritania firmly supported Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War which greatly
affected its
own ties with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United States.

However, Iraqi-Mauritanian ties started to cool down in 1996 when Nouakchott
began its
rapprochement with Israel and the United States. …

(Husain Hindawi is the editor of United Press International’s London-based Arab
News
Service. His weekly column is published in the Arab media and in English. His
views are not
necessarily those of UPI).

(6)

In the Levant: A new diplomatic success for Iran

HUSSAIN HINDAWI

LONDON, Aug. 3 (UPI) – It was not so long ago that revolutionary Iran’s Islamic fundamentalists spoke scathingly of their Gulf neighbors as followers of the Great Satan, in other words the United States. But the short surprise visit of United Arab Emirates State Minister for Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed al-Nahyan to Tehran last week was a sign of how much things are changing in Iran’s relations with the Gulf. .

Ostensibly, the UAE minister’s visit to Tehran was to relay a message of congratulations to President Mohammed Khatami on his recent re-election for another four-year term. But the trip – the first by a high-ranking UAE official in more than a decade — ended a long phase of cold and sometimes strained relations between the two countries Moreover, the fact that the visiting delegation included three sons of UAE President Sheikh Zayed, underlined the importance that the Gulf nation attached to bettering the relationship.

After the visit, at least one dispute that has poisoned Gulf – Iranian relations seemed closer to a solution. This was the future of Abou Mousa, the island strategically situated astride the Hormuz Straits at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, which Iran has occupied since Britain withdrew its presence from the Gulf in 1971, together with two nearby smaller islands, Lesser and Greater Tumb. The UAE also claims ownership of Abou Mousa and its outlying islands. A fifth of the world’s oil supplies pass through the Hormutz Straits each year.

The visit came at a time when, as unofficial Iranian sources told United Press International, the Iranian government was working on a plan to relinquish the three islands, in return for a commitment from the UAE and the Gulf countries to sign joint cooperation security agreements with Iran. This would include a pledge not host any foreign military, especially a U.S. military presence, in the Gulf, and to refer to the Gulf by its internationally-recognized name of Persian Gulf and not Arab Gulf.

In what is regarded as a conciliatory gesture, Tehran recently cancelled a 1992 decision requiring entry visas for Gulf citizens wishing to travel to Iran. The rule had been considered highly provocative in the Gulf states because it included travel to the three disputed islands.

Iran and the UAE each claim absolute ownership of the strategic islands. Each country has used documents, political and even covert military threats to support its claim. At the same time, however, several Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have signed security accords with Iran, thereby tacitly admitting that Iran does not represent a threat in the Gulf, which is the main justification for maintaining a U.S. military presence in the Gulf,

Iran has carried out several military maneuvers the past years on Abu Mousa island, drawing protests from the UAE. The Gulf state periodically complained to the U.N. that Iran was carrying out aggressive acts in UAE territorial waters in violation of their 1971 memorandum of understanding over the island, and attempting to “impose a new illegitimate reality by consecrating the occupation and annexing the island by force.”

In retaliation to such Iranian “threats and aggressions,” the UAE signed a military accord with Britain which is committed to come to the UAE’s defense in case it comes under attack. The UAE also concluded a giant deal with the U.S.aviation corporation Lockheed Martin to purchase 80 F-16 jets at some $6 billion, with the first batch to be delivered in 2004.

Direct dialogue between the UAE and Iran began following President Khatami’s re-election, but the shift from confrontation to rapprochement between Iran and the Gulf states began in his first term and followed the end of the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. Most Gulf countries except the Sultanate of Oman sided by Baghdad against Tehran in that conflict, for internal and external reasons.

The death of Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini had also helped in improving relations for it ended the enthusiasm for exporting the Islamic Revolution to then internally-weak Gulf countries. Improved relations flowed naturally from this reduced militant aggression. Last year, the annual summit of Gulf leaders in Riyadh for the first time did not end with the ritual condemnation of the Iranian occupation of the three UAE islands. Instead they called for a new chapter in Iranian – UAE relations.

That new chapter would be a significant step towards Iran’s goal of a Gulf regional defense organization (which could be joined by Iraq later). Tehran hopes this would reduce the need for direct U.S. military intervention — just as Tehran’s new alliance with Saudi Arabia at OPEC has strengthened Riyadh’s resolve in resisting Washington’s pressure to make changes in oil production.

(Hussain Hindawi is the editor of the London based Arab News Service of United Press International. His weekly column is published in Arab media and in English, and does not necessarily reflect the views of UPI.)

(7)

Yemen hopes for a future prosperity

Friday, 23 February 2001 20:00 (ET)

In the Levant: Yemen hopes for a future prosperity

By HUSSAIN HINDAWI

LONDON, Feb. 23 (UPI) — Yemen’s municipality elections and referendum for

amending the country’s constitution Tuesday have revealed, sometimes in

violent ways, the deep political and security crisis the country has faced

since its southern and northern regions were unified in 1990.

The General Popular Conference (GPC), the ruling party founded and headed

by President Ali Abdallah Saleh, said the elections for 7,000 local posts

across the country were a step towards decentralization through the

formation of local councils which would have financial and administrative

authority.

Yemenis were also called upon to vote on amending the constitution to

extend the presidential mandate to seven instead of five years and that of

parliament from four to six years, and to empower the president to dissolve

parliament. The party said the changes, if passed, would “consolidate

stability and security” and guarantee more order in the next presidential

elections.

The main opposition parties had another reading on the changes. The main

opposition Yemeni Socialist Party called for voting against the proposed

constitutional amendments, calling them a device to extend Saleh’s

presidential mandate to the year 2013, thus ensuring he remains in power for

23 years.

They also described the municipality elections as “forged and

illegitimate” and demanded a new vote and another referendum to be

supervised by a neutral committee.

The ruling party disregarded opposition protests and confirmed the

unofficial initial results indicating a victory for its candidates in all

parts of the country, with the fundamentalist Yemeni Grouping for Reform

(Al-Islah) coming in second. It said voter turnout was “a historical record”

with more than 80 per cent of the electorate going to the polls.

But the government’s claim that this week’s elections were the safest

ever, with no incidents of violence, was contradicted by its own security

authorities. Four people and two policemen were killed and three others were

wounded on voting day, according to Yemeni security authorities, while 113

incidents were reported.

Other sources have indicated that 10 people were killed in

elections-related incidents while the Yemeni Grouping for Reform accused the

government of assassinating one of its candidates. The party called for the

arrest of the suspected killers and blamed the incident on “election

hysteria caused by the extremist rhetoric of the ruling Party.”

Meanwhile, a source at the ruling GPC accused extremists affiliated with

the Yemeni Grouping for Reform of attacking a polling station in Al-Himah

area in Sanaa Governorate. Three policemen were killed and five others

wounded in this attack.

In a separate incident, the Nasserite Popular Unionist Organization

accused security and GPC members of killing their candidate in the Al-Bayda

Governorate when vote counting showed that he was ahead of the ruling party

candidate.

The other political parties — including the (former ruling) Yemeni

Socialist Party, Nasserite Popular Unionist Organization, National Baath

Party and “al-Haq” (Right) Party — criticized the ruling party for

attempting to “establish a complete dictatorship,” and accused the

government of “forging votes and interfering in the elections when

government and Army officials went to the polls to terrorize the voters in

violation of the law and constitution.”

None of which surprised observers. On the surface, Yemen – unlike its Gulf

neighbor states – has a democratic system of government. But since he came

to power with the army’s backing President Saleh has adopted “a defensive

policy of striking hard at anyone who could challenge his leadership,” said

one expert on Yemeni affairs.

Observers say Saleh would like to model himself on Iraqi President Saddam

Hussein, who has strong personal ties with the Yemeni leader, but the Yemeni

President has said the problems he faces have undermined that ambition. The

government is weakened by strong tribal loyalty and ties; has failed to deal

with lawlessness and unrest in the south of the country; and faces an

increasing budget deficit which has now reached $14 billion. There are also

border disputes with Saudi Arabia and Eritrea; and Islamic fundamentalist

groups which have found a fertile ground in this Arab country.

A further threat to its stability is the number of the “Arab Afghans”-

Arabs who fought in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan in the 1980s — live in

fortified enclaves outside the authority of the Yemeni government, and

attend religious schools supervised by the Yemeni Grouping for Reform. They

mainly belong to extremists fundamentalist groups-the most famous being

“Mohammed Army” (in reference to Prophet Mohammed) and the “Islamic

Deterrent Forces” which both claimed responsibility for the suicide attack

against the destroyer U.S.S. Cole in the Yemeni port of Aden last October,

killing 17 servicemen and wounded 39 others.

Yemeni tribesmen have resorted to kidnapping foreigners to pressure the

Sanaa government into allocating funds and offering services to their

regions. According to unofficial statistics, more than 2,000 foreign

tourists or workers were snatched in Yemen during the past 10 years. Most of

these hostage-takings ended with the eventual release of the captives

unharmed. But in 1998 four westerners, who were among a group of 16 tourists

kidnapped by Muslim extremists, were killed when Yemeni security forces

stormed the kidnappers’ hideouts in the Abyen district.

Yemen today reminds seasoned journalists of many African countries two

decades ago. Its infrastructure, including roads, electricity and

communication, are badly in need of modernization. It seems to teeter on the

brink of a dangerous crisis.

Its future political stability, observers say, depends on the government’s

ability to make intelligent use of its resources. A recent $5 billion gas

exploration deal with the French oil and gas company Total and the U.S.

corporation Hunt projects the export of 5 million tons of liquified gas for

which Yemen is set to receive $700 million in revenues per year.

Yemen’s oil production, on the other hand, reached 360,000 barrels a day

early this year with annual revenues estimated at $700 million. But daily

production was expected to reach 430,000 barrels after completing works at

two more fields in east Yemen whose reserves of crude oil are estimated at

5.7 billion barrels.

(Hussain Hindawi is the editor of the London based Arab News Service of

United Press International. His weekly column is published in Arab media and

in English, and does not necessarily reflect the views of UPI.)

—

(8)

—

In the Levant: ‘Shoe Bomber’ controversy

By Hussain Hindawi

LONDON, Jan. 2 (UPI) — The case of Richard Reid, the Muslim Briton now being held for allegedly attempting to blow up the American Airlines plane on which he was traveling from Paris to Miami, has provoked intense debate both in and outside Britain’s Muslim community over the role of fundamentalist clergymen and preachers, particularly those assigned to British prisons.

The 28-year-old Reid — an Anglo-Jamaican Muslim convert now known as “The Shoe Bomber” because of the explosives said to be in his shoes — had been a regular attendee of a mosque in Brixton, South London since his conversion a few years ago while serving a sentence in a British prison for minor offences.

Abdul Haqq Bakr, the mosque’s chairman for the past eight years, believes Reid embraced extremism after leaving jail when he met some of the “most extreme elements” in London’s Muslim community. At that point, Reid started wearing military gear and talking about fighting a jihad or holy war.

Reid took the name Abdel Rahim, and according to Bakr, attended the mosque for instructions in mainstream Islam. But Bakr said Reid soon began to denounce his teachers as too “passive” in the face of perceived Western injustice.

Bakr estimated that out of as many as 1,000 extremist Muslims in the Britain, at least 100 were potential suicide bombers.

Before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on New York and the Pentagon, small protests were often organized in front of London’s main mosques in support of the Palestinians and Chechnya. The protestors mainly included Arabs from North Africa and some Europeans who had converted to Islam and who were often bearded and dressed in white clothes.

They were believed to be followers of extremist groups influenced by the Wahhabi (Saudi fundamentalists), or by the Algerian militant Ali Balhaj and Egyptian Ayman Al-Zawahiri, a prominent figure in Islamic Jihad.

By contrast, most of those praying in the mosques avoided extremists. There are more than 2 million British Muslims and available statistics indicate that nearly 1,000 mosques stand in England alone. Most of these are old or deserted churches, or houses transformed by Muslims for worship to accommodate the needs of a growing Muslim community.

Some sources claimed that Reid was somehow connected to Zacarias Moussaoui, a French citizen of Moroccan origin. Moussaoui, the only person thus far charged in connection with the Sept. 11 attacks, regularly worshipped at the same Brixton mosque as Reid.

Whether the two actually met is still open to question. Also unconfirmed is whether Reid acted alone or as part of a larger network — despite rumors of a possible connection to Osama bin Laden’s al Qaida network and the training camps in Afghanistan.

But Bakr said he does not believe Reid could have acted alone. The mosque’s chairman claimed that he has received many threats from extremists groups who want to use the mosque to propagate their ideas among young worshippers. Though still a minority in the Muslim community, extremist groups have been “growing frighteningly over the past four or five years.” Five years ago Bakr warned the London police about his concern over extremist elements, but no action was taken.

The Brixton mosque, which was constructed in 1990 in southern London, has some 400 worshippers and offers services to Muslims of Caribbean origin –mostly newcomers to Islam — regarding marriage, divorce, Arabic language and Islamic studies.

The increasing Islamic conversions by British youth of Caribbean and African origins have been fueled recently by three main factors:

— Marginality: Feeling as outcasts in British society despite the importance of the anti-racism laws.

— Admiration: Looking up to major black personalities of African origin who converted to Islam, especially Malcolm X, Mohammed Ali Clay, singer Cat Stevens, and Louis Farrakhan, whose Islamic Nation group is active in Britain.

— Fulfillment: Bonding among students and youth the “special brotherhood care” provided by the Islamic centers.

Since fundamentalist organizations were allowed to provide radical preachers for Muslim prisoners, many British Muslim prisoners have been indoctrinated in Islamic extremism. Now, moderate Islamic community leaders have urged British prison authorities to consult with them before visiting clergymen are appointed to the jails.

Customarily, a Muslim commissioner is appointed to visit Muslim prisoners and ensure that they have books and proper food, while preachers go to prisons at least once a week to lead Friday prayers. Such measures reflect the rising number of Muslims in British jails over the past decade who have made Islam the second largest religion among prisoners.

Sources familiar with Britain’s Muslim community say many radical groups brought in preachers who knew nothing about the United Kingdom’s culture system and only cared about attracting Muslim youths to their extremist views.

However, a spokesman for the British Islamic Council called reports about the spread of Islamic extremism in Britain, and its jails in particular, overblown.

David Wilson, a former prison official who conducted a study of more than 4,000 Muslim prisoners supports this view. His study, he said, did not indicate that government-appointed clergymen to British prisons were extremists.

Wilson said the preachers faced “constantly bad and racist treatment” and “unbearable conditions in prisons where they performed a great role and had nothing to do with extremism.”

In a recent report, Wilson stressed a strong spirit of solidarity among Muslim prisoners who face difficulties in practicing their religion. He said it was highly exaggerated to describe such a solidarity as extremism.

Wilson also emphasized that it took 10 years to appoint the first Muslim consultant in British jails in 1999.

While the Sept. 11 events ushered in a new era internationally, the Reid incident opens a new phase in the history of the Islamic community in Britain, one of the most settled and well established outside the Islamic world.

Its journalists and spokesmen have clearly distanced the community from the “scoundrels” like the Egyptian Abu Hamza al Masri and the Syrian-born Omar al Bakri who give the community a bad name and are used as an excuse to attack it.

-0-

(Hussain Hindawi is the editor of United Press International’s London-based Arab News Service. His column is published simultaneously in English and in the Arab media, and does not necessarily reflect the views of UPI.)

(9)

Iraqi Kurds give up idea of independence ,

By Hussain Hindawi

London., Sept. (UPI)– Iraqi Kurds appear to have abandoned the idea of establishing a Kurdish state in northern Iraq in the post Saddam era, and are opting to preserve the unity of the country they share with the Arabs and other peoples.

This shift in what was a long-established Kurdish policy has emerged as the dominant theme in recent speeches by leaders of the main Kurdish groups, Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and Masoud Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party.

At the root of the switch were political realism and the Kurds’ own best interests.

As a result non-Kurdish Iraqi opposition groups appeared more ready to accept the Kurdish wish for a federal Iraq consisting of largely self-ruling Kurdish and Arab areas.

Iraq’s unity was dangerously undermined after the 1991 Gulf War when, in the north, the Kurds rose against Saddam Hussein and for a brief period seized control of Iraqi Kurdistan from the central government in Baghdad.

Following a similar rising by Shia Muslim Arabs in the south, 14 of Iraq’s 18 provinces were briefly lost to Saddam before he repressed both risings.

Part of Iraqi Kurdistan remained out of Saddam’s hands, protected by American and British air patrols. It was partitioned between the PUK, with Sulaimaniya as its capital, and the KDP, based in Arbil.

Talabani and Barzani seemed to be in agreement on consolidating the Kurdish position of not taking about independence.

Talabani said in a recent interview with United Press International in London that there was no salvation for Iraq except by ending the dictatorship and establishing a federal democratic regime that would respect the rights of all parties in Iraq.

The Kurds calls for maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq and giving up the idea of independence is also realistically in keeping with Washington’s rejection of the establishment of a Kurdish state, not to mention the opposition of neighboring Turkey, Iran and Syria to such an idea.

It was Washington’s ‘no’ to the partition of Iraq that settled the debate within the Iraqi Kurdish nationalist movement over independence.

But Washington has also promised the Kurds protection from assaults coming from Baghdad. Barzani has called on Washington to guarantee security for the Kurds, insisting the guarantees should be public. He said the Kurds will not accept anything secret in this regard

The PUK and KDP leaders seek roles in a post-Saddam Iraq as not merely leaders of the Kurdish minority. Both have long political experience, are widely respected and have been successful in running their respective areas over the past decade.

Asked if the Kurdish alliance with the Shiite opposition groups was meant to target the Sunni Arabs, historically the dominant political group in Iraq, Talabani said he was himself a Sunni and that such talk originated in the Baghdad regime.

Talabani stressed that for him “Iraq is a country for all and there is no difference among Iraqis based on race, religion or sect.” He also denied allegations that the Kurds, under U.S. and British protection, were in no hurry to depose Saddam. To the contrary, he said, the Iraqi Kurds were well aware that a great number of their fellows are still under the control of the central government.

Barzani also has said repeatedly the Kurds are both part of Iraq and the wider Kurdish region that lies in adjacent areas of Turkey, Iran and Syria.

“It is wrong to believe that federation is an attempt to partition Iraq, ” Barzani said, “when on the contrary it will consolidate national unity, guarantee the just rights of the Kurdish people and put an end to internal conflicts.”

Both Kurdish leaders believe that the solution to Iraq’s problems lies in changing the Iraqi regime into a democratic one, forming a coalition government and electing a parliament through free and honest elections with representation for all ethnic groups.

But both leaders have repeatedly warned they are not ready to take part in any operation to change the Iraqi regime unless they know what kind of government is to follow. They want the guaranteed establishment of a federal and democratic regime in which the Kurds, as a major element in the mosaic of Iraqi society, can play an important part.

While population figures are uncertain, observers estimate that the Kurds make up about 4 million out of Iraq’s estimated 23 million people.

“If the alternative is another dictator, the first to be harmed will be the Kurdish people who would have wasted all they have achieved in the past years,” said Talabani.

The Kurds fear being abandoned by Washington should it fail in its attempt to depose Saddam. They also fear that the U.S. administration might leave them at the mercy of a new government in Baghdad inclined to destroy their autonomy and repeat the slaughter of the 1980s when tens of thousands of Kurds died in Saddam’s Anfal campaign.

The Kurds also remember that Washington let them down when they rose against Saddam in 1991 after President George Bush senior called on the Iraqis to rise and overthrow Saddam.

And they remember how in March 1975, after having been egged on by Washington to fight Baghdad as part of U.S. support for Iran in a dispute with Iraq, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger cut off aid to them over night, enabling the Iraqi army to takes its revenge.

A KDP proposal for drawing up a post-Saddam federal constitution has been widely criticized by the Iraqi opposition, rejected by Turkey and received with caution in Washington.

Such a constitutional initiative increases fears in Turkey and Iraq’s other neighbors of an independent Iraqi Kurdish entity emerging. Any such entity, Ankara fears, will prompt its own restive Kurdish population, estimated at 12 million, to demand similar conditions for itself.

Turkish officials have accused the Iraqi Kurds of using a U.S. war on Saddam as cover for setting up an independent state.

So the Iraqi Kurdish leaders are obliged to constantly assure their neighbors that their goal is not to have their own independent state, something that Turkey has declared would be a cause for war.

(Hussain Hindawi is the editor of United Press International’s London-based

Arab News Service. “In the Levant” is published in English and in Arab

media. Its views are not necessarily those of UPI.)-

End.

(10)

Saddam and Chirac: A 30 Years Relationship

LONDON, March (UPI) – France is seeking a peaceful solution of the Iraqi crisis with the hope of boosting its influence in Iraq which is slated to become the first world oil exporter. At the same time, French President Jacques Chirac will be consolidating its position as the faithful heir of former President Charles De Gaulle’s policy of independence from the United States.

But the Iraqi government is watching with great suspicion France’s declared intention of using its veto power to block a U.N. Security Council resolution allowing the use of military force against Iraq. Baghdad said several times that it was wary of Paris’ hesitation and double standard policies and that it expected France to back down eventually and adopt the U.S. stance. Baghdad believes that Chirac will end up joining the U.S. campaign as his predecessor Francois Mitterrand did when he dispatched forces to the Gulf in 1991 to take part in the Desert Storm operation which evicted Iraqi occupation forces from neighboring Kuwait.

Opponents of the Iraqi regime accuse France of duplicity and falseness and consider its opposition to unilateral use of force against Iraq as a fake behavior. They also believe that France’s speech challenging U.S. hegemony is for local consumption and aimed at winning Arab public opinion which is suspicious of the true French policies on Iraq.

The opposition accuse France as well of violating international law and the charter of the United Nations when it comes to safeguarding its interests, arguing that Paris was opposed to war to avert the ouster of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein who is a good friend and a good client.

The opponents go as far as accusing President Chirac of complicity with Saddam for over a quarter of a century, claiming that they had personal relations and struck friendly deals under which Baghdad generously financed Chirac’s election campaigns and offered an annual financial assistance to the Gaulist Rassemblement Pour la Republique party, founded by Chirac.

The opposition’s accusations were based on mutual public declarations of admiration made by Chirac and Saddam during the former’s visit to Baghdad in 1975 when he was France’s prime minister. It was that visit which ushered in the golden age in French-Iraqi relations. Soon after, France helped Iraq build its first nuclear reactor, the Ozirak, which was bombarded by Israel in 1981 after receiving information from the U.S. as well as France.

Also, after Chirac’s visit, Iraq became the first purchaser of French arms and France’s main oil supplier. Saudi Arabia which topped the list of importers of French arms until 1980, came second after Iraq in the wake of the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war. From 1980 until the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait French arms exports to Iraq and Saudi Arabia amounted to 75 percent of France’s total arms sales.

The French official stance on the Iraqi crisis is at least on the surface opposed to war, taking into consideration that Paris has lots of interests at stake especially that Iraq is slated to become the world’s number one oil producer and supplier.

Obviously France is undecided and hesitant regarding Iraq because its interests will be in a better position if Saddam’s regime persisted. With the right back in full power, Paris is seeking to exploit the card of “friendship” between Chirac and Saddam again, along with the veto card to discard dangers posed on French oil interests by the Russian lobby which succeeded in straining French-Iraqi relations last year.

According to observers, the struggle is at its utmost between the French and Russian lobbies over influence and interests in Iraq. France was strongly criticized by Baghdad last year when it agreed on the “smart sanctions” passed against Iraq at the U.N. Security Council. At the time, Iraqi daily Babel, which is run by Saddam’s eldest son, Uday, warned France that its stance endangered the businesses of French oil companies and their privileges in Iraq.

France’s oil company, Total Elf, has exclusive negotiations rights over the southern major oil fields of Majnoun and Bin Omar and was about to sign new oil contracts lately before the Iraqi oil minister was dismissed for canceling other oil contracts with Russia.

France which is seeking to play a key role in the region, is also hesitant to build true relations with any party of the Iraqi opposition. France is still the only major European country which does not receive Iraqi opposition leaders or hold official dialogue with them.

End

(11)

Analysis: No big news expected from summit

By Hussein Hindawi

International Desk

Published 3/27/2002 11:05 AM

BEIRUT, Lebanon, March 27 (UPI) — The Arab League’s two-day summit opened in Beirut Wednesday amid expectations that it would not produce anything of importance.

Despite what some saw as unprecedented Arab unanimity to make a success of the meeting, the absence of key Arab leaders stripped the parley of most of its importance.

The last-minute decision by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to stay away was particularly damaging. He was the 10th Arab head of state to apologize for his absence.

Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, kept confined to the West Bank town of Ramallah by the Israeli military, has not come because Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon found he did not meet the required conditions to be allowed to travel to Beirut, a refusal that Arafat has defiantly affirmed. Another consideration affecting his absence was the fear, expressed by Mubarak and others, that were Arafat to leave the Palestinian territories, the Israelis would prevent his return.

Other no-shows are King Abdullah II of Jordan, Kuwait’s Emir Sheikh Jabir al-Sabah, Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Hamad al-Thani, Oman’s Sultan Qabus, United Arab Emirates President Sheikh Zayid, Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi and Mauritanian President Muawiya Uld Sid Ahmad Uld Taya.

The main topic for discussion in Beirut will be Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah’s proposal for bringing about peace in the Levant by having Israel pull out of the lands it has held since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war in exchange for the Arab states normalizing relations with it.

Although the initiative came from one of Washington’s main Arab allies, Saudi Arabia, the U.S. administration showed little enthusiasm for it. Instead, Washington put pressure on Lebanon to call on the summit to endorse the U.S. view of fighting terrorism that entails reigning in Lebanese Hezbollah’s continuing attacks on Israeli targets.

Arab esteem for Lebanon swelled when the forces of its Shia militant party, Hezbollah, forced Israeli troops to quit the country in May 2000. The Lebanese also wished to show off Beirut as once again a top tourist resort in the Middle East and to use the summit to try to get Arab countries to meet financial commitments to help Lebanon overcome its severe economic crisis.

But for these reasons, the summit would otherwise probably have been cancelled, given the region’s present troubled circumstances. But no Arab country wanted to take responsibility for aborting the meeting.

At the last Arab parley, held in Amman, Lebanese President Emile Lahoud’s asked for the next summit to be in the capital of the first Arab country to impose a military defeat on Israel. Thereupon the United Arab Emirates deferred and withdrew its bid to play host to the summit.

Despite strained Lebanese-Libyan relations since the 1978 disappearance in Libya of the most senior Lebanese Shiite leader, Imam Musa Sadr, Gadhafi went along with Beirut as the site for the meeting.

The Arab leaders are expected to back the 18-month old Palestinian intifada against Israel although there is a widespread feeling among them of not being in a position to confront Israeli action against the Palestinians.

Sharon’s use of violence is commonly described by the Arabs as barbaric and his banning Arafat from attending the summit was expected to weaken any interest some Arab states may have had in normalizing relations with Israel.

(12)

bc-libya-commentary
In the Levant: Libya’s love affair with Africa

By HUSSAIN HINDAWI

LONDON, July 19 (UPI) — Libyan leader Col. Muammar Gadhafi scored a political coup recently when the African summit in Lusaka dissolved the 38-year-old Organization of African Unity, replacing it with the African Union, a more modern structure focussing on economic development, unity and conflict resolution. The African leaders had decided the change at their earlier meeting in the Libyan city of Sirt last May.

Gadhafi had pressed for a more ambitious structure aloong federal lines similar to the United States of America, and had even wanted it named the “United States of Africa.” The Gadhafi plan called for dissolving all African national armed forces, and establishing a joint armed forces that would essentially confront any foreign aggression. But the proposal was opposed by a number of African countries which refused to relinquish so much of their independence, in the interest of union.

Still, the Africans overwhelmingly give Gadhafi credit for the formation of the new union. In recognition of his seminal role the Libyan leader was lavishly praised when he attended the Lusaka summit.

The importance of the African Union lies in its Charter which envisions the establishment of an African consultative parliament and financial institutions, including the African Monetary Fund and an investment bank. It also calls for equality, sovereignty, cooperation among member states, respect of border and non-interference in the internal affairs of other member states, banning the use of force against another country and rejection of any non-Constitutional change of the political system.

The African Union is to be led by a higher committee that would include heads of state and government besides an executive council whose members would be foreign ministers or others.

Libya described the African Union announcement as the “greatest day in Africa”
that “marked the birth of a new international giant: the Black giant that would consolidate security, peace and stability in the world.”

A Libyan government official went a step further, saying that the African Union would “consolidate demands by the Africans to have a permanent seat at the U.N. Security Council after they proved that they are capable of adopting major resolutions beyond the (African) continent border so that to have positive impact on the humanity.”

At present, the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council are the United States, Britain,France, China, and Russia.

Besides successfully brokering a cease fire between the warring factions in Sudan, Gadhafi’s regime is offering to mediate in some of the other conflicts involving 20 of the African organization’s 53 members. Gadhafi’s offer included the dispute between Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia; Burundi and Democratic Congo; Sierra Leone and Angola. Similarly, Libya offered generous financial aid to a number of countries in the Black Continent and promised to offer more.

Libya’s shift in interest towards Africa came two years ago, when Arab leaders angered Gadhafi by failing to make any attempt to break the air embargo imposed on Libya by the U.N.Security Council following the 1988 Lockerbie incident. In January a Libyan intelligence officer was found guilty in connection with the bomb explosion on Pan Am Flight 101, which crashed in Lockerbie, Scotland. Some African countries, on the other hand, continued to support Libya throughout the long trial.

Libya’s losses due to U.N. sanctions were estimated at $30 billion. Annoyed with what he perceived as “Arab indifference” towards Libya Gadhafi reproached the Arabs for their failure to show solidarity.

Last year, the Libyan leader warned that the Arabs might face the same fate as “the Kurds, Gipsies and Armenians” if they did not make a commitment to greater unity.

Since the 1968 revolution that brought Gadhafi to power in Libya, the regime has made
Arab unity its priority. Libya signed border agreements with Syria, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria. But every one of those accords eventually ended in disagreement, and the disillusioned Libyan leader began to talk of Arab unity as “mere writing on sand.”

Gadhafi even considered that all his country’s setbacks were caused by of the what he considered were sacrifices made “for the sake of the Arabs.” He said, “The quest for unity is a mirage that has only brought problems and pain” to Libya.

Libya accused the Arabs of “losing 50,000 opportunities, including losing Palestine and themselves,” according to a Tripoli newspaper.

In reality, Gadhafi saw himself as the successor of late Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, but it soon became clear that no other Arab country took this ambition seriously, and it received no support from any important Arab thinker. Thus all Libyan calls for Arab unity since the early 1970s got no response from other Arab countries, and the division deepened into complete rupture once Gadhafi established his own form of govenment — the Libyan “Jamahiriya.”

This complicated system of government which ostensibly shifted political power to people’s committees, but in reality left Gadhafi with more power than ever, impressed no one in the Arab world-even those who longed for a democratic life.

The biggest reality in the Arab world today is that Gadhafi’s famous “Green Book” — a sort of Libyan version of Mao’s Little Red Book — is today forgotten, although millions of copies were distributed in various languages.

Libyan over confidence and the bombastic language used by Libyan media mostly contributed to this rupture, which was certainly not helped by the ambivalent messages coming out of LIbya, which fluctuated between right pragmatism and the most

extreme revolutionary proposals.
Thus, it would be difficult to predict how long Libyan enthusiasm for African unity will last, or whether it would suffer the same fate as Gadhafi’s support of Arab unity. All the more so as Africa is characterized by ethnic diversity and regional conflicts far more complex than in the Arab world.

For the moment, though, it’s all systems go for Libyan investments in African countries, with $800 million in LIbyan investment projects, a newly established Libyan-African Investment Company with a $220-million capital, and six banks set up focussing on African development.

(Hussain Hindawi is the editor of the London based Arab News Service of
United Press International. His weekly column is published in Arab media and
in English, and does not necessarily reflect the views of UPI.)

(13)

Commentary: Baath mass graves litter Iraq

By Hussein Hindawi

LONDON, May 19 (UPI) — I could have been among the thousands of bodies — now become skeletons — cramming mass graves that are being discovered near virtually every city in Iraq.

This stark evidence is emerging of perhaps the worst crimes committed by the toppled Baath regime of the deposed despot Saddam Hussein. Hardly a single family in Iraq was spared from the massacres against humanity committed by the ousted rulers, and we can expect many more such discoveries in the months ahead.

A young journalist at the time, I was arrested on May 10, 1971, 32 years ago. Capt. Saad al-Aazami, who was then in charge for a decade of torturing political prisoners, threatened to send me to the “death hole.” In recognition of his 10 years of faithful service as Saddam’s chief torturer, al-Aazami was appointed president of the National Wrestling Association and is now on the run.

I was luckier than many others as no damning evidence was presented against me, but 13 of my cousins were not so lucky. They ended up in one of Saddam’s mass graves. My 8-year-old niece Amina was injured and taken to a hospital after which Hussain Kamil, Saddam’s brother-in-law, ordered the elimination of all those in the hospital, including staff, doctors and patients.

Mass murder of political opponents is a basic feature of the ideology of the Baath Party founder, a Syrian named Michel Aflaq. But large-scale killing was only applied in Iraq after the Baath Party first came to power in a bloody coup d’etat in 1963. Mass executions became established state practice for 35 years, following the second Baathist coup in 1968.

The mass grave discovered in the area of Mahaweel near the ancient city of Babel puts to the lie Saddam’s claims that he came to power to restore the glory of the Babylon civilization. In fact, 40,000 sons of this holy region were executed on the site where Saddam later built one of his most luxurious palaces.

In 1969, shortly after the second Baath Party seized power the second time, al-Tahrir (“Freedom”) Square in the center of Baghdad witnessed the hanging of 20 Iraqis accused of belonging to a spy ring working for “Zionism and imperialism.” The corpses were buried in one mass grave in the capital, as tens of leftists were killed and dumped in another mass grave following a failed rebellion in southern Iraq.

In January 1970, 50 military and civilian personnel were executed on conspiracy charges and buried in yet another mass grave.

Although former Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr started the trend of mass graves during his 11 years in power, mass murder and burial sharply increased when Saddam “retired” al-Bakr in 1979. In fact, Saddam inaugurated his regime by personally supervising the massacre of 100 fellow Baath leaders, civilian and military, for conspiracy. They were interred in an unknown mass grave believed to be located in Baghdad.

During the 1980-88 war between Iraq and Iran, Saddam sent tens of thousands of troops and officers to mass death and burial after they were accused of treason and cowardliness. Executed on the battlefield by special death squads, their graves are as yet undiscovered.

Prior to the 1990-91 Gulf War, large mass graves continued to litter various parts of Iraq. Their occupants were Kurdish citizens, victims of the ethnic cleansing campaign carried out by Saddam’s cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid, known by his sinister nickname “Chemical Ali,” who served as governor of Kurdish northern Iraq from 1987-89.

With full executive powers and four army battalions under his command, Chemical Ali executed a campaign that resulted in the murder of 180,000 Iraqi Kurds and the arrest of 182,000. Indeed, al-Majid earned his nickname from Western diplomats and observers because of his “experimental” use of chemical agents to dispatch an estimated 40,000 victims. The fate of the majority of the incarcerated remains unknown; however, recent reports indicate thousands were buried in mass graves in the desert of Ar-ar, close to the Saudi borders, as well as to the north in Ramadi and near Mosul.

After such stunning “success” with the Kurds, the Baath regime targeted the Shiite community, subjecting it to organized extermination in the wake of their abortive rebellion following the first Gulf War. The number of Shiites executed in the spring of that year is estimated to exceed 200,000, mostly from cities in southern and central Iraq. Many Shiites believe the United States was indirectly responsible for the massacres because, having encouraged the insurrection, the United States declined actively to support it.

Although the mass killings tapered off, they continued until the end of the regime. In 1999, hundreds of Shiites were put to death for supporting religious leader Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, who was assassinated for opposing Saddam.

Saddam’s government repeatedly denied accusations by human rights groups and the Iraqi opposition of mass killings. The large number of mass graves discovered recently testify to the large-scale atrocities committed by the ousted regime, and are a source of embarrassment to Arab governments and human rights groups, which had long refused to acknowledge, much less seek to curb, such wildly macabre practices.

At present, hundreds of Iraqis are searching the mass graves uncovered in different parts of the country for the remains of missing loved ones. Voluntary committees, including university students, have been set up to document information on the identity of victims’ remains that are being unearthed.

Families of victims converged on the newly discovered mass grave in the city of Mahaweel, 55 miles (90 kilometers) south of Baghdad, desperately checking human bones and faded identity cards in search of the remains of a father, a brother or a relative who went missing under Saddam’s regime. So far, workers have unearthed 4,000 sets of remains from the site where some 15,000 victims are believed to have been buried.

Shortly after Saddam’s downfall, a mass grave was discovered in Basra containing the corpses of 126 people. More recently, another grave containing the remains of 40 victims was discovered in Abu al-Khassib, and 72 bodies were removed from a mass grave near the holy city of Najaf.

The Kurdish authorities have announced that they have discovered several mass graves near the oil centers of Kirkuk and Erbil with the remains of 4,000 people, including women and children, executed by firing squads.

The Center for Documentation of Human Rights in Iraq has estimated the number of mass graves created prior to 1994 exceeded 100. Found throughout the country, the sites usually were located near military barracks, large prisons and headquarters of the Baath party.

The mass graves are grim evidence of the atrocities committed by the Baath regime against the Iraqi people. What virtually every family in Iraq had experienced is now graphically and indisputably clear, for all the world to see.

The uncovering of the graves will not bring back my cousins and niece, any more than the overthrow of Saddam will bring back generations killed in his unending wars. The mass graves should, however, finally convince the most skeptical of the long overdue need and justification to remove this terrible scourge — this Butcher of Baghdad.

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Hussein Hindawi is editor in chief of UPI’s London-based Arabic News Service.

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Commentary: Lawlessness and Iraq’s future

By Hussain Hindawi

LONDON, April 12 (UPI) — The assassination of Iraqi Shiite cleric Abdul Majeed al-Khoei in the southern Iraqi city of Najaf on Thursday and the extensive looting in other cities have drawn widespread condemnation by Iraqis inside and outside the country.

Iraqi intellectuals said these conditions have also prompted questions on the future of Iraq in light of the collapse of a strong central authority and the initial reluctance of the U.S. and British forces to take control of the security situation.

Some said the refusal of the war-honed coalition forces to move rapidly into a security role was intended by Washington. They claim the decision was aimed at pushing Iraqis to accept the continued presence of the forces as a fait accompli.

The Iraqi opposition so far has failed to fill the vacuum left by the fall of the central ruling Baath Party by assuming authority in southern and central cities, Baghdad, Mosul and Kirkuk. It has failed to follow the example of the strong and united Kurdish parties that had immediately replaced the duties of the collapsing central authority in northern Iraq in 1991.

This tragic vacuum has shed some light on the conditions that led to the assassination of al-Khoei, who seemed to have hoped to assume a central role in filling the vacuum upon his return to Iraq.

But he disregarded the presence of other groups seeking the same role, namely the supporters of the late spiritual leader, Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr, who was assassinated by the Iraqi authorities three years ago, also in Najaf.

Only days before the killing of al-Khoei, it was announced in Najaf that a newly formed group of 700 was to coordinate an interim administration, taking control of the city’s affairs, to “control security and order in other liberated provinces, in cooperation with tribal leaders there.”

Iran, which on Saturday condemned the assassination of al-Khoei, had recently criticized his independence from Iran when he formed the “Higher Shiite Council.” Al-Khoei Institute was granted observer status at the United Nations for as an international Shiite institution.

Tehran was also critical of his relations with a number of Western governments, especially the British. Al-Khoei had met with Prime Minister Tony Blair several times.

Blair had expressed his “deep sorrow” at the killing of al-Khoei at the hands of unknown assailants. He described him as “a religious leader that represented hope … for building a better future for the Iraqi people.”

The White House also strongly condemned his assassination, saying it was “regrettable,” and it offered the condolences of the United States to “the people of Najaf.

White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said it was an example of “the serious situation in Iraq.”

Al-Khoei ventured into this difficult task and might have been able to successful had he lived. But the success would have been explosive, and perhaps led to complicated problems sooner or later, because of the contradictions and deep rifts within Iraqi society, particularly among the Shiite majority.

The Shiites have suffered greatly during the past 35 years being subjected to harsh political and sectarian repression. Saddam Hussein’s regime intentionally ripped apart this majority, stripping it of any political representation since 1980, and after liquidating the Islamic Da’wa Party established by the late Islamic scholar, Ayatollah Mohammad Baqer al-Sadr, in the early 1960s.

During the 1980-88 Iraq-Iran war, organized Shiite political activities were centered outside the country.

The 1979 victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran strengthened these forces before the Iranian authorities refocused its attention on the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq, led by Ayatollah Baqer al-Hakim, which was now offering itself as a basic organization in representing the Iraqi Shiites. But that is also rejected by many.

SCIRI played an instrumental role in controlling Iraq’s southern and central cities during the uprising in the spring of 1991, which was violently crushed by Saddam’s regime.

But it failed to play a similar role in the current war due to the widespread score-settling facing the Iraqi opposition.

Another reason is Washington’s refusal to open Iraq’s doors to SCIRI’s supporters and forces in Iran, known as “Failaq Badr,” estimated at 10,000 fighters, because of its strong ties with the Iranian government.

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(Hussain Hindawi, the head of UPI’s Arabic service, grew up in Iraq and now lives in London.)

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Analysis: Iraqi army no pushover

By Hussain Hindawi

LONDON, March 21 (UPI) — The nagging question overshadowing all others as the United States and its allies launch their early probing attacks is: What will the Iraqi army do under the mounting pressure?

One widespread conviction — with many adherents in the Bush administration — is that all the United States has to do is kick the door down, and Saddam Hussein’s regime will collapse. But some seasoned military experts in Washington and elsewhere believe the going will be tougher than that.

Some units of the regular army will fold quickly, these experts say. There are early reports that Iraqi soldiers are defecting in large numbers. But based on their performance in the 1991 Gulf War other military units will give a good account of themselves.

Iraq’s army has gone through several phases, starting as a national institution charged with defending the country and its sovereignty from foreign aggression, and from 1968 changing by degrees into the military arm of the ruling Ba’ath party entrusted with ensuring the party’s control of the country.

Today, the army is a huge militia loyal to the dictator, Saddam, led by his family and mainly occupied with internal repression and external attacks.

Founded in 1921, it has the historic distinction of having staged the first military coup d’etat in the Arab world. That was against British rule.

The Iraqi army witnessed huge growth in terms of numbers, armament and classical fighting experience during the 1980-88 Iraq-Iran War. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 the Iraqi army was the fourth largest in the world.

But the Gulf War reduced its effective strength, and it now numbers slightly under 400,000.

One military expert in Washington says the elite Republican Guard heavy units “get the best officers and the best soldiers.” The same is true of the regular army heavy units, which proved a tough nut to crack in the Gulf War.

In the Gulf War the heavy units’ “quality of resistance in Iraq was higher than in Kuwait,” one expert said.

On the other end of the quality scale are the motorized divisions that are likely to crumble at first hit. And the expert said the 38th infantry division is considered the worst in the Iraqi army.

In addition to the regular army, in 1994 Saddam set up the Forces of Saddam Guerrillas under the command of his eldest son, Uday. The 15,000-strong force stationed in Baghdad consisted of organized militias equipped with tanks, armored vehicles and heavy guns poised to crush any internal rebellion against the regime.

Then two years ago, Saddam ordered the creation of the Quds (Jerusalem), Army which numbering millions of voluntary fighters dedicated to liberating Jerusalem from Israeli occupation. But the real aim of the new army was to replace the old Popular Army, which disintegrated when many of its members took part in the popular rebellion against the regime in 1991.

The Popular Army was little more than a military structure for containing the Iraqi youth in order to control them. It was also a place to absorb “unreliable” senior officers who had been sidelined from sensitive army positions because their loyalty was uncertain.

Once a major client of the Soviet Union, the Iraqi army is well equipped, even if their hardware is antiquated. Armored units have 2,600 battle-worthy T-72 tanks. While most of them are obsolete, they still have to be dealt with.

True to their Soviet training, the Iraqis depend on heavy artillery and have lots of it — 2,800 long-range guns.

The same is true of the Iraqi Air Force’s planes.

Most of the senior officers are members of Saddam’s tribe. The officers and soldiers have suffered from a sharp decline in their livelihoods. So the army — always an elite group — is even more so in Iraq.

Its mystique is enhanced by the fact that it is a taboo subject, which cannot be discussed or even mentioned by political parties, the media or citizens under the threat of being accused of treason, punishable by death.

In a way, the Iraqi provides a perfect example of Saddam’s paranoia. He has created several intelligence units within the armed forces to spy on each other. Any direct coordination or communication between the commanders of units and brigades to prevent plotting against the regime.

In the meantime, former Iraqi officers who broke away from Saddam praise the courage and nationalism of the regular army and revolutionary guards who might play a decisive role in changing the regime in Baghdad if a group of officers were to decide to turn against Saddam.

But Iraqi opposition leaders believe that such a possibility is very remote since Saddam’s tribesmen control all key positions in the armed forces and would block any attempted coup.

The reality is that the Iraqi army currently lacks any leaders who could win the respect of the people: it has merely become a tool in Saddam’s hands. Iraqis believe that charismatic army commanders are a thing of the past.

The last one was Abdul Karim Qassim, who led the July 1958 revolution that ended British rule in Iraq. Qassim was prime minister in 1959, until his execution by the Ba’ath regime in February 1963. Now Saddam will find out if he can do better.

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Analysis: Post-Saddam Iraq as murky as present

By HUSAIN HINDAWI, UPI International Editor

LONDON, Jan. 23 (UPI) — Iraqis, and Arabs in general, believe that the U.S.-run war to oust President Saddam Hussein’s regime is imminent despite the return of the U.N. inspectors to search for weapons of mass destruction in line with the latest Security Council resolution.

In a televised speech to mark the 12th anniversary of the 1991 Gulf War — in which he compared President Bush with the 13th century Mongol leader Hulagu Khan, grandson of Genghis Khan — Saddam said his country has mobilized to confront any U.S.-British attack. But, he said, the situation was different today from when Hulagu swept across his country in 1258, and the U.S. attackers would find Iraq fully prepared.

But it may not prove so different. Few expect the Iraqi army, its fighting capacity reduced to less than half what it was in the 1991 Gulf War, to resist long in case of a large-scale U.S. invasion. Iraq lacks a unified internal front, and, despite public demonstrations of support in the Arab world, is isolated both in that same Arab world and internationally.

Baghdad has strongly denied news reports that Saddam might step down and go into exile to prevent a U.S. war against his country. So Iraqis wait for all hell to break loose, which they believe will happen sometime after Feb. 20, following a final report from the U.N. arms inspectors mission on their findings.

Whatever it says, Washington will insist that Iraq still possessed weapons of mass destruction posing a threat to the United States and the whole region.

Saddam’s regime is not expected to resist for long a massive U.S. attack, and the post-Saddam should come suddenly and quickly. But the question is what kind of post-Saddam?

The answer remains unclear, but the possible scenarios put forward by analysts include a U.S. military occupation, an international civilian administration similar to the one operating in Kosovo, a transitional government grouping Iraqi opposition factions, and a military government following an Iraqi army coup d’etat.

The scenario of a U.S. military occupation will not be accepted by the majority of Iraqi opposition groups, including Washington’s allies, according to Iraqi political observers. They argue that even Saddam’s staunchest enemies will dread the prospect of having their country under foreign occupation for a long time.

One extreme view of some observers is that a U.S. occupation might prove worse than Saddam’s regime itself. Iraqis with a sense of history remember that Iraq formed an alliance with Britain against Ottoman rule in 1916, only to end up under British mandate.

At the root of the problem is the fact that even Iraqi opposition groups allied to Washington don’t entirely believe U.S. promises to install democracy and a multi-party regime in post-Saddam Iraq. “The United States is motivated by its own private interests to oust Saddam, and it serves our interests to see him out,” a political observer said Thursday. “That’s the only thing we have in common and we have to thank them for their assistance. But we should not allow them to occupy our country or to rule us,”

He argued that Washington would win the Iraqi people’s gratitude and respect if it helps them get rid of Saddam and install democracy without direct military occupation — but this seems unlikely.

Another possible scenario, according to political observers, is a take over by the army in a military coup d’etat that would end Saddam’s dictatorship and prevent Iraq’s occupation. A majority of Iraqis would back such a scenario, though with reluctance. It would at least prevent a disastrous war with the United States.

The same observers ruled out an Arab administration under the supervision of the Arab League. “It is most naive to expect the Iraqis to accept Arab tutorship to install democracy in Iraq since the Arabs have no clue about democracy,” one observer said.

The fourth scenario, namely a transitional government representing Iraqi opposition groups, appears to be the likeliest and most appealing to the Iraqi people. Opposition groups held a congress in London last December, reaffirming their commitment to set up a democratic, parliamentarian and federal system in Iraq to preserve the people’s unity and the country’s territorial integrity and independence.

But the Iraqi opposition is without proper leadership, marred by internal divisions, and lacking popular backing at home. There are other internal difficulties, too, which makes it inevitable that changes on the ground will have to be implemented by U.S. forces.

Moreover, the Iraqi opposition, largely dependent on Washington, is weakened by the lack of any clear U.S. vision for its future role.

All scenarios are possible, but what is most definite is that any post-Saddam regime will have to be pro-United States, at least during the transitional period that might stretch on for an indefinite period of time.

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By Hussain Hindawi

In an open letter to the Iraqi president, Tweini proposed that he should quit in return for asylum in another country.

But he stayed on in Baghdad, consolidating his position by purging a number of high officials and replacing them with trusted collaborators.

These days, Arab newspapers have been filled with “leaks” from Arab and Western diplomatic and intelligence sources, quoting Iraqi officials as saying that Saddam would refuse to receive any Arab delegation, at any level, that came to Baghdad to ask him to quit his post, or even to discuss the issue with him. Press reports say he would even refuse if the decision were taken in an Arab summit convened for the purpose.

Arab sources said a delegation from a Cairo-based organization called the Egyptian Committee for Solidarity with the Iraqi and Palestinian People was heading for Baghdad in an effort to persuade the Iraqis to form a “national salvation” government.

Sources in the group, which includes former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark and former Algerian president Ahmad Benbella, said the new government would include Iraqi opposition groups and would remove the tough restrictions imposed on the Iraqi press.

More significant was the slowly mounting pressure from some Arab governments to find a way out of the crisis. Well-connected Arab sources said they expected a change in Egyptian policy towards Iraq, and Iraqi opposition figures would soon be received in Cairo.

The sources credited British Prime Minister Tony Blair with convincing Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on the need for a regime change in Iraq while the Blair family was on vacation in Egypt last fall. They said they expected high-level Egyptian officials to lead an Arab initiative to pressure Saddam to resign and leave the country with his family and close collaborators. Saddam would be offered asylum in another Arab country.

Meanwhile, semi-official Arab sources said Saudi Arabia has told Washington it will make a last effort to find a diplomatic solution to the Iraqi crisis if the U.N. arms inspectors showed in their upcoming report on Jan. 27 that they could find no evidence that Iraq was building and storing weapons of mass destruction.

So far — the sources said — efforts connected with the idea of Saddam abandoning his post have been conducted “from a distance.” However, some Arab officials believe there could be an extraordinary Arab summit held in Baghdad, in which Saddam would surprise the other Arab leaders by announcing his resignation.

The possibility of Saddam resigning has not received the same attention in the United States and the West and preparations for war are gaining momentum. But Arab commentators make the point that Washington has not delegated anyone to explore this possibility either with Arab governments or directly with Iraq.

Arab talk about unseating Saddam, however, reflects a growing desire among Arab governments to resolve the crisis for themselves, without a U.S.-led intervention.

Some Iranian government officials have also joined in voicing their expectations regarding the issue. Sources close to the decision-makers in the capital, Tehran, said Friday that Russian President Vladimir Putin was mediating to persuade Saddam to resign, but there was no confirmation of this from Moscow sources. They said that German foreign minister Joska Fischer had told his Iranian counterpart in a telephone conversation that Washington was seeking a “bloodless coup” with the help of the Russian president.

They also claimed that Russian Arabist and former Prime Minister Yvgeny Primakov was arranging a visit by Putin to Baghdad to convince the Iraqi president to abandon his position and to take him to Moscow.

Meanwhile, speculation and rumors continue as to the country Saddam would choose for his exile. While some believed he would go to an Arab country, especially Egypt, Algeria or Libya, others mentioned Cuba, North Korea, and Belarus.

Iraqi Trade Minister Mohammad Mehdi Saleh last week insisted that the Baghdad regime would put up a fierce fight against an American attack in the coming months, “more fierce than during the 1991 Gulf war.” He said that the Gulf War “revolved around whether or not to withdraw from Kuwait. Now, the issue is whether or not to abandon our land, and this we will fight for.”

Many Arabs give little credence to the idea that Saddam or any other Arab ruler would go voluntarily, although the region has witnessed a number of departures from power in the past 50 years.

Saudi Arabia’s King Saud was expelled from his country in 1955, Yemeni President Abdallah Salal was overthrown in 1966, and the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, fled his country a few weeks before the victory of the Islamic revolution in his country in 1979.

The Iraqi Baath Party itself has a precedent when Saddam announced in 1979 the “resignation” of his predecessor, Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, “for the service of the nation and cause.” This was regarded as an internal military coup, especially after the authorities in Baghdad declared the “mysterious” death of Bakr a few weeks later.

The Iraqi opposition is divided into two camps regarding the future of Saddam. One camp, which includes many members who served Saddam at one point, say Saddam would prefer death to such a solution. They say the Iraqi president could not accept a defeat. The familiar remark that “Saddam reserves the last bullet in his pistol for himself,” however, is widely regarded as naive.

The other opposition camp expects Saddam would not hesitate to make a concession to cling to power, no matter how humiliating, if he found himself forced to do so. He has made such humiliating concessions to Iran in 1975, and to the United States when he accepted the cease-fire terms of the 1991 Gulf War.

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(Hussain Hindawi is the editor of United Press International’s London-based Arab News Service. “In the Levant” is published in English and in Arab media. Its views are not necessarily those of UPI.)

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Analysis: Iraqi opposition still divided

By Hussain Hindawi

LONDON, Dec. 20 (UPI) — The London conference of Iraqi opposition groups ended this week with an apparent agreement to establish a parliamentary, democratic and federal political system in Iraq once Saddam Hussein has been ousted, and to set up a broad-based follow up committee.

But their success remains limited — largely dependent on Washington’s eventual decision to go to war against Iraq, and more precisely on the military strike being successful in overthrowing Saddam’s regime. There are other internal difficulties, too.

The presence of the U.S. presidential envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad — and his affirmation that Washington was determined to topple Saddam once and for all — strengthened the opposition’s conviction that Saddam’s days were numbered. But as a result the conference got bogged down in disputes over power sharing in the immediate post-Saddam phase, and failed to address the long-term issues related to the future of their country.

The follow up committee is scheduled to meet on Jan 15 in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq to continue the complicated task of choosing a leadership.

The conference decided to hold a referendum on whether Iraq should remain a republic or become a constitutional monarchy.

The federal system adopted unanimously by the delegates recognized the civilian rights of the Christian and Turkmen communities, reaffirmed the unity of the Iraqi people and the integrity of its national territory, and recognized the Kurds as a major ethnic group.

Whether these decisions have a better chance of survival than dozens of similar previous decisions taken at past parleys over the last 10 years has yet to be seen.

But the most alarming fact was that the word “democracy” was not even mentioned by the Iranian-backed Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq — or SCIRI — which claims to represent Iraq’s majority Shiite community.

Another worrying question was whether former army generals and ex-intelligence officers who are accused of human rights violations while in office had a place in a committee supposedly responsible for laying down the foundations of Iraq’s future democratic ruling system.

Yet another flaw in the conference was the poor representation of women in the 65-member leadership committee, despite the presence of a large number of female opposition figures. Only three women were named to the committee set up by the conference.

At the regional level, the Iraqi opposition is expected to attract broader Arab interest after the London meeting. In the past Arab interest in the Iraqi opposition was confined to Syria and Libya. The majority of Arab governments refused to have contacts with exiled Iraqi leaders for fear of offending Saddam’s regime — even after Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait.

Significantly, last week Saudi, Egyptian and other Arab newspapers urged their respective governments to open a dialogue with the Iraqi opposition.

For all the positive signs, internal differences continue to beset the Iraqi opposition. The London conference was least successful in closing and unifying opposition ranks. On the contrary, the prospect of political gains is bound to further split an already divided and weak opposition.

Criticism was rising against what some see as the dictatorship of Ahmed Chalabi, leader of the Iraqi National Congress, who surrounded himself with a posse of bodyguards throughout the meeting.

Differences and schisms are expected to increase among Shiite groups as well as the independent politicians who now form blocs with different cultural identities.

Several minor Shiite factions quit the conference in protest against SCIRI’s monopoly over Shiite representation. A Shiite liberal leader, Mowaffak al-Rabii’, argued that the Shiites constituted a large community and no single group can pretend to represent them exclusively.

“There are several Islamic, and liberal trends among the Shiites and all Shiite groups should be represented in order to express the interests of the whole Iraqi people,” al-Rabii’ told United Press International.

Most of the opposition groups that took part in the London congress have opted for full and total alliance with the United States.

For their part, the Kurds — represented by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan of Jalal Talabani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Massoud Barzani — are expected to rely on their own force, buttressed by their growing closeness to the Bush administration.

These two parties, which have shared control over northern Iraq since the 1991 Gulf War, have their own armed forces, experienced administrations and important resources.

The Kurds represent the most pivotal and the most pragmatic group in the opposition. They will seek to gain time until the United States makes a final decision about Iraq’s future.

The Kurds — who actually govern parts of Iraq under the protection of the U.S. no-fly zone — are not expected to make any change in their current strategy, or their role within an opposition that would be ineffective without them.

Suspicion of Washington’s intentions came mainly from independent opposition leaders who are mostly old opponents to Saddam’s regime. They have little faith in U.S. intentions and fear that a military occupation will emerge as the United State’s favored alternative to Saddam’s rule.

A leading independent Kurdish figure summed up the message of the congress this way: “The international community is requested to help the Iraqi people and install democracy — but without any military rule.”

He stressed that the Iraqis welcomed the help of others in bringing about a regime change in Baghdad, but were against placing any conditions that would stop them from exercising their rights in deciding their future through voting and elections.

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Sept. 11: Backlash for Islamic militants

By Hussain Hindawi

(Part of UPI’s Special Package on Sept. 11)

LONDON (UPI) — To Westerners the theory that Osama bin Laden is in reality a CIA agent is as outrageous as it is far-fetched. But in the conspiracy-ridden world of Islamic fundamentalism, there are many who privately believe it possible.

Still today there is a divide between Islamists who fought with the mujaheddin against the Russians in Afghanistan in the 1980s and those who did not. The campaign had strong U.S. support. The guerrillas in the Afghan mountains like bin Laden had close links with U.S. intelligence, raising the question whether the old intelligence ties are still there.

Many fundamentalists regard the Sept. 11 terror attacks in New York and Washington masterminded by bin Laden as a mixed blessing at best. They argue that the immediate effect of the death of so many Americans and the destruction of famous landmarks in both cities – although fully repaired in record time in Washington — has been to goad the United States into waging a global war against terrorism.

Arab analysts report that Sept. 11 has undermined the political strength and ideological influence of the Muslim fundamentalist movements in the Arab world. Deep sectarian, regional and ideological differences surfaced among those different movements, creating divisions.

Far from being the hero among Arabs that the Western media make him out to be, Osama bin Laden has cost fundamentalist Islamist movements public support. The failure of extremist groups to mobilize the public opinion against the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan was a clear indication of their isolation.

The groups blamed this failure on government suppression, but the fact was that in supporting the Taliban regime Islamic fundamentalists had picked an issue that failed to arouse mainstream Arab emotions. The Talibans, with their fanatical approach to Islam, had never enjoyed much admiration in the proverbial Arab street.

After Sept. 11, all Islamic fundamentalist trends, especially the hard-line Wahhabi movement that is accused of being the most extremist, have been criticized in most Arab countries. The negative impact of 9-11 on Arab extremists would have been even greater had there been opposition alternatives in most Arab countries.

But the lack of democracy, economic deterioration, rampant government corruption and what is widely seen as Washington’s unbalanced policies in favor of Israel make the fundamentalist movements the only counterweight to unpopular regimes.

Never before have Arab fundamentalist groups been so divided in terms of ideology and multiple objectives. Some bluntly advocate armed violence and even terrorism, but there are others that reject such an approach. Some have local national goals while others seek Islamic global-reach goals.

The Saudi-based Wahhabi organization has seen its influence outside the Gulf decline. In the past year it has seen the inroads it made in Egypt, Algeria, Pakistan and even among Iraqi Kurds during the past two decades backed by Saudi money reduced because of its association with Osama bin Laden.

In contrast, the Shiite groups appear to have benefited from the setbacks suffered by Sunni extremist movements by stressing their rejection of violence and distinguishing between violence and the legitimate resistance against foreign occupation, a reference to the Palestinian West Bank and Gaza. The Lebanon-based Hezbollah, or party of God, is a good example of Shiite extremism cloaking itself in the more “respectable” role of liberation movement.

While fundamentalist groups are in a state of complete ideological confusion, a liberal Islamic trend is gaining strength and importance in the Arab world. But the new liberal trend still lacks clear political goals and courage. It also remains little known in the West because Western media have preferred to focus on pro-western groups.

The challenge before the Arab intellectuals has become greater after Sept. 11. There is a need to talk openly about the need for greater Christian-Muslim understanding and for an Arab-U.S. dialogue.

Today, a year after what al Qaida calls Holy Tuesday and the rest of the world refers to simply as 9-11, there is broad agreement among Arab intellectuals that the attacks marked the end of the fundamentalist movements’ dream of emerging as a strong and unified organization not only at the national but also international levels.

Extremist groups, which were very active and enjoyed strong popular bases in such countries as Egypt, have dwindled into pockets often acting underground. Such pockets will continue to seek renewed strength in unity, but that goal seems out of reach.

In reality, the U.S.-led offensive against Islamic fundamentalist groups gave many Arab regimes an opportunity to settle accounts with such groups. Eager to cooperate with Washington, Arab governments rounded up known militants and handed over to the United States.

But the purge has hardly been complete. Some smaller groups still exist in a number of Arab countries — perhaps future al Qaidas. Among those worth mentioning are Tafkir and Hira in both Morocco and Sudan, Struggling Salafiya in Morocco, the Islamic Waad (promise) group and Islamic Liberation Party in Egypt, and Partisans of Islam in northern Iraq. In addition, there are the Islamic extremist cells in Jordan and the Dinniyeh group, Al-Nour and the Palestinian Esbat al-Ansar in Lebanon.

In Algeria, Arab commentators warned of new groups formed by former members of the Islamic Army for Salvation (the military wing of Islamic Salvation Front), who surrendered to the authorities between 1999 and 2000 in exchange for a official pardon.

In Yemen, it is believed that there are various groups in tribal regions and some southern areas, such as the Jihad Movement. Members of the Aden-Aben Islamic Army are due to stand trial charged with the bombing attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden. Security sources say the same group was responsible for the 1988 kidnapping and killing of some western hostages.

—

(Hussain Hindawi is editor of UPI’s Arabic News Service in London. This analysis is part of UPI’s Special Package on the one-year anniversary of the Sept. 11 terror attacks).

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Commentary: Give Muslims their due

By HUSSAIN HINDAWI

LONDON, Nov. 30 (UPI) — The Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington — which Osama bin Laden is suspected of masterminding — have made him the man who has done more damage to the West’s image of Oriental and Islamic civilizations than any other.

This view has been propounded by most of the Arab world’s intellectuals, particularly the secular ones who have no love for extremist groups and sects anyway.

But Arab intellectuals have been shocked at the way Western writers have used those terrorist crimes to settle accounts with another civilization — denying its brilliant cultural and spiritual contributions. Nor do they understand how a number of Western politicians can so easily confuse terrorism and Islam.

Limiting the history of the Muslim Orient to the negative manifestations of extremist groups, terrorist organizations and dictatorships neglects the scientific, philosophical and spiritual contributions of this great historical movement.

Isn’t this akin to limiting the history of the Christian West to mere negative manifestations such as the religious wars, the Nazi holocaust, the annihilation of Indians?

The idea that Western civilization is superior to that of the Orient is naïve at best. Western civilization remains indebted to the Middle East for many of its major achievements.

This is why statements by a number of conservative European figures such as Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher about the inferiority of Muslim civilizations are more than surprising: They’re disgusting and unjust.

Such statements provoked angry reactions from Western as well as Oriental intellectuals — at a time when many Muslims and Arabs were the targets of a wave of hatred in the United States and Europe.

Many Orientalists, scientists, religious leaders and politicians in the West condemned these attempts to humiliate Islamic civilization and to attack Islam — whose followers exceed 1.2 billion people — because of attacks carried out by a few Islamic terrorist groups.

Italy’s great writer Umberto Eco criticized Berlusconi for his simplistic argument in claiming that the Christian European civilization is superior to the Islamic one. In a long article in the French Le Monde newspaper, Eco said “Western civilization has produced the good and bad guys,” and pointed out that “Hitler and Mussolini were the sons of Western civilization.”

Eco said, “It is important now for Westerners to present the good side of Western civilization to all religions and ethnic groups in order to avoid new bloody confrontations not only at present time but in the future.”

In Rome, too, Christian organizations were quick to organize meetings to prevent hatred from replacing dialogue among the various religions faiths. The meetings were attended by religious leaders from the Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant churches as well as prominent Muslim religious leaders from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran.

Other Italian writers besides Eco pointed out that Berlusconi’s outburst was xenophobic, reflecting conservative opposition to other religions and cultures, especially Islam, which conservatives view as the most dangerous.

Berlusconi told Arnaud de Borchgrave last May that Islamic extremism and communism — and not terrorism — were the main dangers facing Europe today.

When President Bush used the word “crusade” in his calls for an international war on terror, the Bush administration quickly corrected the provocative description. Berlusconi waited days to express regret for his statements about Islamic civilization and went on accusing journalists for distorting his words.

In her first comment on the Sept. 11 attacks, Thatcher said she did “not hear enough condemnation of such actions from Muslim religious leaders” since “those who destroyed the twin towers of the World Trade Center are Muslims, and the Muslims should thus stand and say this is not Islam.” But Thatcher completely ignored the condemnations coming from leading Muslims in her own country at that time.

Thatcher and Berlusconi, however, were more restrained than some European right-wing leaders who overnight dropped their declared enmity towards the United States and began to shed crocodile tears on the victims of the terror attacks in New York and Washington — using this change to launch a large campaign against foreign immigrants and foment hatred against Arab.

One French right-wing leader declared: “Our main enemy is Islam” and described the nearly 4 million French of Arab and Muslim origins as the “fifth column which wants to destroy the French European society.”

But why is this madness in igniting a war between civilizations after centuries of co-existence? As German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder said, “War on terror is a war for the sake of civilizations and not against them.” This position would be affirmed by most leaders of Western countries and others in their call to resolve the causes of terrorism and uproot it.”

For many Christian, Jewish, Muslim and secular intellectuals, reason should prevail over rumors. An effort needs to be made to understand others and their problems as well as to avoid imagined “conflicts” between civilizations.

To say that Eastern and Western minds differ is major mistake. The mind is one. We should also stop using “fundamentalism” in describing extremist Islamic, Christian or Jewish religious movements.

We should look for the root causes of terror in the Arab world — not in religion or civilization — but in the absence of democracy and freedom, the high percentage of illiteracy and poverty in the rich region.

Most importantly the major role of colonialism in most Arab countries — which only gained independence recently from Britain and France — should be understood. Britain withdrew from the Gulf region in the early 1970s while France was forced to leave Northern Africa in 1962.

Washington is also to be blamed for its many wrong-headed policies in the region — and not only regarding the Palestinian problem. These are mistakes that a great number of U.S. and Western writers referred to.

Those who link the name of bin Laden or hard-line groups to Islam or the Arabs are simply settling old historical accounts with the Islamic civilization and Arab culture by concluding that Western civilization and European culture are superior.

They are committing harmful mistakes at the same time. They are revealing a terrible ignorance which is worsened by segregating cultural groups that are only vital in their inter-actions.

Finally, they are wrong to think they are creating new positions and ideas when they are only reviving old views — some dating back to the Middle Ages.

Linking Islam to fanaticism, Arabs to violence and the East to despotism were famous cliches in the West’s view of the Orient, especially Oriental Islam, before they were overturned by intellectuals during the enlightenment.

—

(Hussain Hindawi is the editor of United Press International’s Arab News Service in London. The views he expresses here are not necessarily those of UPI.)

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Iraqi dinar rises amid smuggling scandals

By HUSSAIN HINDAWI

BAGHDAD, Jan. 17 (UPI) — Iraq’s new currency started off with strength as it is being dealt with more widely in international money changing markets. But this start is shrouded with high speculation, and scandals of forgery and smuggling of large quantities of the new dinar to Arab and Gulf countries, including Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, Iran and Kuwait.

Dealings with the old Iraqi bank notes, bearing the pictures of deposed president Saddam Hussein, ended officially on Thursday. And the new dinar, introduced to the market last Oct. 15 by the U.S. command in coordination with the Iraqi Central Bank, became Iraq’s official and sole currency.

The new currency comprises bank notes from several denominations, namely bills in 50,000 dinars, 250,000, 25,000, 10,000 and 5,000 dinar bills. Piles of the old bank notes were destroyed, mostly burned, in the past few months.

The Lebanese authorities on Wednesday arrested three people in the capital, Beirut, for smuggling 1.5 tons of Iraqi currency in a private plane from Iraq to Lebanon, via Jordan, estimated at more than 19 billion new Iraqi dinars (around U.S. $12 million).

Investigations might reveal the political or security conditions behind transporting this amount, which required permission from Lebanon’s Central Bank so as not to be accused of money laundering.

They could also reveal the possibility of involvement by American parties in a large money laundering operation conducted secretly, since landing and take-off at Baghdad Airport only take place with permission from the U.S. occupation forces in Iraq.

The political implications in the smuggling operation could become known as the Lebanese look into the motives behind trafficking such an amount, especially at a time when Beirut and Damascus face growing U.S. pressure.

Meanwhile, the Egyptian authorities in Cairo said Thursday that the authorities at the Red Sea port of Nuwaibeh arrested 32 Egyptian passengers arriving from Jordan who carried 650 million new Iraqi dinars. They were believed to be traded it on the black market in the hope that its value would rise when the conditions in Iraq stabilized in the future.

The incident came as a fever swept other Arab countries in creating a black market for the Iraqi currency. Arab and Iranian merchants have been rushing to buy the new Iraqi dinars at low prices in their countries, or at 1,200 dinars to the U.S. dollar and less.

An official at the Iraqi Central Bank told United Press International that some Iraqi employees might be involved in the smuggling operations, adding that initial investigations showed involvement by bank employees with money traffickers. He said the Central Bank provided special facilities to several bank tellers due to the extraordinary conditions Iraq is passing through.

The official, speaking on condition of anonymity, added that a special committee would be formed to investigate cases of forgery and smuggling. He stressed the “need to protect the Iraqi economy from money laundering that takes place in developing countries, including neighboring Arab countries.”

He said that “gangs of quick fortune are very active in these countries, and some of their members are Iraqis.”

The source also revealed that the authorities have found foul play in some of the banks when the Iraqi currency was being renewed, in which the authorities seized forgeries of more than one billion old dinars, the ones with the picture of Saddam.

He said that most Arab and Asian countries have begun dealing with the new Iraqi dinar “because of its difficulty in forging, and because it is directly supported from the Iraqi oil exports.”

The U.S. dollar exchange rate dropped to a new low at the end of last week, registering 1,400 dinars to the dollar in Baghdad, the lowest in eight years. The dollar rate began to gradually drop on a daily basis since the beginning of last December, falling from 2,000 dinars to 1,500 by the end of the month. The drop continued in the past two weeks.

The Central Bank official said the decline in the exchange rate was due to the availability of the U.S. dollar in Iraq by the growing number of foreign investors in the country. He said that led to wide scale movement of the new Iraqi dinar to outside countries, mainly Jordan, Kuwait and Iran.

An Iraqi financial expert expected the value of the Iraqi dinar to continue rising, but insisted that the increase had nothing to do with the hike in prices of commodities in the Iraqi market.

He said the price hikes “are not justified because they did not happen as a result of hard currency entering the country through oil revenues or through trade growth. They did not happen because the there has been no strong return of the Iraqis abroad, but which is expected to happen when stability is restored in Iraq.”

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Bahrain and the democracy dream

By Hussain Hindawi

There was good news and bad news in last week’s parliamentary elections in Bahrain. The good news was the Gulf nation’s return to parliamentary government, suspended for more than a quarter of a century. The not so good news was two-fold. Women candidates — appearing for the first time on the ballot — failed to gain any seats in the new Parliament. The second was that Islamic extremists scored major gains.

The failure to elect a woman to the Parliament in a society considered the most advanced and open among the six Gulf countries was a setback. So was the fact that the country’s Shiite majority had boycotted the election, leaving the way clear for Salafi Islamists to control the Parliament, and for a number of extremists to step in.

The disappointing fact that the newly elected Parliament would not reflect the structure of the Bahraini society and was not likely to tackle much needed political and economic reforms has diverted much of the attention from the importance of the elections themselves.

Despite the difficulties and limitations, Bahrain’s return to constitutional democracy is an important gain for its people. It is a major step for Bahrain and an important one for all other states in the region, especially in the Gulf.

By granting equal electoral rights to both men and women, Bahrain even offered a better formula than its only competitor in the region: Kuwait.

Four political groups, which had earlier secured a sweeping victory in the municipal elections months ago, decided to boycott the parliamentary elections on the basis that the elections lack constitutional legitimacy, but affirmed they will respect the right of other groups participating in the elections. These four groups — the leftist National Democratic Action, the Shiite Islamic Action, the Democratic Nationalist Grouping and the Islamic National Reconciliation Association — also called on their followers to refrain from any action that would disturb the country’s security and stability.

Bahrain dissolved its first Parliament in 1975, nearly two years after it was elected, and replaced it with a Shoura Council affiliated with the government. A 40-member Shoura, or consultative, Council to be named later by the king will make up the other section of the Bahraini legislature.

Shortly after the reigning Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Issa al-Khalifa succeeded his father in 1999 Bahrain held a referendum on a National Action Charter, which defined plans to introduce constitutional reforms in the Gulf emirate. At that time, 98.4 percent of the Bahrainis voted in favor of the charter.

A year later, Bahrain was declared a constitutional kingdom with an elected municipality councils and Parliament. Such a move followed the abolition of the state security law, the release of detainees and a general amnesty that pardoned all opponents living abroad.

The opposition — both traditional leftist and Islamist — boycotted the elections because they want the elected Parliament to have wider constitutional prerogatives as it did in the 1973 constitution to carry out reforms. But observers noted that Bahrain politics have been free from any incidents of violence or extremism. The parties are also shrewd enough to take every opportunity to express support for the emir’s reform plan.

They also cited violations such as not allowing human rights and electoral groups to monitor all polls, preventing international monitoring of the elections, forcing military men and interior ministry employees along with their families to vote as well as using all government media institutions to pressure the citizens into taking part in the elections.

One clue of the ruling family’ intentions will be how seats they monopolize in the new Cabinet — a much criticized practice in the past. The opposition is also focusing on the need to fight widespread administrative and financial corruption, and has ambitions to become the financial center of the whole Gulf region because Bahrain is located at an intersection of complicated and countless interests of regional and international forces, such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran and the United States.

news desk for editing)

In the Levant:
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Saudi prince has political ambitions in Lebanon

BY HUSSAIN HINDAWI

LONDON, July 8 (UPI): The controversial speech made last week by half-Lebanese Saudi Prince Al-waleed bin Talal, criticizing the economic policies of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri explicitly unveiled the prince’s ambitions to play a role in Lebanon’s domestic politics, but same as his $10 million refused contribution for New York post-September 11, he rejected politicizing the matter.

Prince al-Waleed, one of the world’s richest people, with a fortune estimated at $20 billion, blasted Hariri’s economic policies and presented himself as Lebanon’s potential savior from a rampant economic crisis at the inauguration of his $140 million Movenpick hotel on Beirut’s coast on Tuesday.

The prince voiced his criticism in the presence of President Emile Lahoud, an adversary of Hariri.

The criticism coincided with Hariri’s efforts to convene the Paris-2 conference of donor states and international monetary organizations willing to assist Lebanon to overcome its financial straits, especially a staggering public debt of $28 billion under which the country has been reeling for the past few years.

Hariri promised also to generate $5 billion from the privatization of certain public utilities, including the mobile telephone services, electricity and water. He said the money would be used to service and repay part of the public debt.

Al-Waleed’s harsh attack against Hariri in the presence of Lahoud raised question marks and criticism by local politicians, especially that the rift between Hariri and Lahoud is no secret.

But Hariri, also a billionaire, and a shrewd politician and businessman, retorted to the Saudi prince’s verbal assault by saying: I accept such remarks from anyone who wants to build a hotel in Lebanon.

The Saudi naturalized Hariri knows very well the political ceiling of the Saudi prince, although he is a holder of Lebanese nationality from his mother’s side, and the grandson of Riad Solh, Lebanon’s first post-independence prime minister.

What is most amusing is that the Saudi Prince was following into Hariri’s footsteps in trying to infiltrate the Lebanese society, namely through his financial power. He is also one of the most successful businessmen in the world, and related to prominent Moslem Sunni Lebanese families and was seen paving the ground to strike alliances with Hariri’s foes, particularly president Lahoud.

It was also noted that like Hariri, al-Waleed was trying to impose himself in Lebanon through generous donations to social and civilian non governmental organizations as well as financial support to key Lebanese media outlets. As a matter of fact, the prince bought a share in Lebanon’s most prominent newspaper, an-Nahar, becoming Hariri’s partner in that institution, and made grants to the Lebanese state.

Al-Waleed is apparently planning to play a political role after the election of a new president in the autumn of 2004.

He will try to promote himself as an alternative to Hariri and a key to solving Lebanon’s economic problems by relying on his international reputation as a shrewd businessman who enjoys a strong financial power capable of competing with Hariri who had also used his money power to rise to the post of Prime Minister after the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1990.

The first round of the apparent battle for political prominence between Hariri and al-Waleed has been launched, although the Saudi prince was previously attacked by Hariri’s followers for making critical comments of the Lebanese government’s economic policies a couple of months ago.

But sooner, or later, the 47-year-old prince would acknowledge that entering the tumultuous Lebanese politics is complicated and that it would be better for him to concentrate his efforts on making investments in Lebanon, including the construction of hotels and tourist resorts.

In fact, at the end of his speech, al-Waleed announced that works on a new five-star hotel, the Four Seasons, in downtown Beirut was launched and he promised President Lahoud to inaugurate it before the expiry of the latter’s mandate.

(Hussain Hindawi is the editor of United Press International’s London-based
Arab News Service. “In the Levant” is published in English and in Arab
media. Its views are not necessarily those of UPI.)–

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Iraq would have preferred Gore

Article Date 12/20/2000
Jump to: * United Press Int’l * COMTEX * Health News * USATODAY.com * LocalBusiness.com * Health
Commentary: In the Levant –

By HUSSEIN HINDAWI
LONDON, Dec. 20 (UPI) – Until the very last minute, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was apparently banking on Al Gore becoming President of the United States instead of George W. Bush. Saddam believed Al Gore would have followed the same Iraqi strategy as President Bill Clinton – a fact that would have continued the collapse of the 10-year economic sanctions imposed on Baghdad by the United Nations.
President Saddam might believe that he knows the Democrats after eight years of confrontation, but Republican George W. Bush is expected to take a tougher approach towards Iraq.
The president-elect is surrounded by the stars of the 1990 Gulf war. Vice President Dick Cheney if the former Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of State-designate Colin Powell was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The new president is moreover the son of former President George Bush, the victor in the Gulf War, and the man who compared Saddam Hussein to Hitler. With little experience in foreign policy, Bush Junior might possibly defer to his team in dealing with Iraq.
Iraq’s annoyance at Bush’s victory, turned into concern after Colin Powell, in his first press conference following the announcement of his appointment, pledged to work with his country’s allies to consolidate sanctions against Iraq and confront President Saddam one more time if necessary.
In sharp contrast and despite Baghdad’s almost daily harsh criticism of President Clinton and his Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Iraqi officials were almost confident that as president, Gore, like Clinton, would not be enthusiastic about doing anything to really threaten the Iraqi regime – unless Saddam did something foolhardy.
Gore would not have been interested – the Iraqis thought-in implementing the “Law for Liberating Iraq” pushed through the Congress last year but ignored by the Clinton Administration, which limited itself to supporting low-key Iraqi opposition leaders.
In any case, President Saddam is well aware of the big difference between the Clinton approach and that of George W. Bush. At the start of his presidency eight years ago Clinton extended an olive branch to Baghdad, but then backed away following a wave of strong criticism. President-elect Bush has already threatened renewed force against the Iraq leader via his new Secretary of State Gen. Powell.
The Iraqi regime was thus expected to be move cautiously in reply to what it will perceive as new U.S. threats, and focus more on relations with Russia and France – although Baghdad’s dealings with both countries were not always easy, because neither country made a serious effort to pressure the United States and Britain into ending their air strikes and abolishing the no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq.
Iraq will also try hard to push Arab, Muslim, African and some European countries into forcing the United Nations to lift the 10-year embargo and end all other sanctions, which have already begun to crumble as several European and Arab countries have resumed civilian flights to Baghdad.
Iraq’s quick response to Powell’s threat came from a spokesman who said Powell “appears to ignore that the (western) alliance has collapsed and the U.S. has no more backers left except Britain for its policies towards Iraq. Even Britain is trying to distance itself from the United States, although it’s doing so with extreme care and caution.”
But while it would be hard to predict with any certainty the nature of the relations between the new U.S. Administration and the Iraqi regime, the irony is that the old enemies from the Gulf War are once again facing each other for a confrontation of which the outcome remains unknown. .
On the U.S. side, President-elect Bush’s choice of top aides suggests that he was not expected to drastically change his father’s policies. It was Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, James Baker and Condoleezza Rice who shaped President Bush Sr’s foreign policy, particularly on the Middle East.
On the Iraqi side, nothing has changed at all. Saddam is still surrounded by the same team: Izzat Ibrahim as his deputy in the Revolutionary Command Council (who is suffering from cancer); Taha Yassin Ramadan and Taha Maarouf as Deputy President who are said to be “simple messengers;” Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Aziz and Foreign Minister Mohammed Saeed al-Sahhaf are practically without any authority to act independently.
On the other hand, Saddam’s eldest son, Uday, remains at the head of the well-armed Special Forces entrusted to protect the many presidential palaces and secret hideouts, while his other son, Qusay heads the special security, the military and civil services – accused by the regime’s enemies with torturing and killing a great number of opposition members.
(Dr Hussein Hindawi is director of the London-based Arab News Service of UPI; his column appears weekly in English and Arabic media. The views expressed are not necessarily those of United Press International)
—
Copyright 2000 by United Press International.
All rights reserved.

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Saddam needs better diplomats)

UP TO THE OPINION INDEX

Hussain Hindawi

After Iraq failed to convince the most recent Arab summit in Amman, Jordan in March to unite in forcing the United Nations to lift its embargo against Baghdad, and then watched the United States make progress convincing Russia to support an extension of its new “smart sanctions” formula due to be reviewed by the U.N. Security Council in December, Saddam Hussein has done what dictators do in the face of a major setback: He has fired everyone involved.

Some key figures in Iraqi diplomacy are being moved aside by Hussein’s eldest son, Uday, who has the decisive word in all decisions related to Iraq’s foreign policy. They include Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, who still is responsible for Baghdad’s relations with Russia, and Muhammad Saeed Al Sahhaf, who is responsible for Iraqi-Arab relations.

Al Sahhaf was fired as foreign minister last April, following a media campaign against him for failing to secure Arab support at the Amman summit. On his return to Baghdad he had assured Saddam Hussein that the fix was in and Arab countries, led by Egypt and Jordan, would organize the necessary support at the United Nations to lift the embargo.

So the most pressing and complicated problem facing Saddam Hussein today is finding a new highly-skilled foreign minister who can win his complete confidence and confront U.S. plans.

It is clear that Naji Sabri Al Hadithi, the new foreign minister, is a stopgap appointment. Iraq’s diplomacy is a weak structure, which since the Gulf War has been totally subordinate to the Presidential Palace, and operates as a service affiliated to the military and security command.

With no experienced and skilled staff, the Foreign Ministry has become little more than an External Information Ministry. This might explain why most Iraqi foreign ministers were former ministers of information, like Tariq Aziz, Al Sahhaf and Al Hadithi. The last was deputy information minister during the Gulf War after heading the very active Iraqi Press Center in London for many years.

Iraq’s diplomatic corps was weakened further during the past few years after an important number of diplomats known for their loyalty to the Iraqi president either resigned or fled. The most recent defectors were Fallah Hassan Al Rubaiye, Iraq’s representative to the United Nations, and his deputy Muhammad Al Humaimid.

But the list of diplomatic asylum seekers is a long one, and includes former Iraqi ambassadors to Spain (Arshad Tewfiq), Canada (Hisham Al Shawi), Tunisia (Hamed Al Jubori, The Netherlands (Safaa Al Falaki), Venezuela (Majed Ahmed Al Samarei) and France (Muhammad Al Mashat).

Many others are expected to follow suit in the coming months. Observers believe that the new foreign minister’s loyalty to the regime of Saddam Hussein will remain in doubt because of the troubled relations of the Al Hadithi family with the Iraqi leader. His two brothers, Muhammad and Shukri Al Hadithi, were arrested after being charged with conspiracy against Saddam Hussein in 1979.

Muhammad, who was the Iraqi Foreign Ministry’s director-general, died in prison after being tortured. Shukri was released after spending six years in prison where he too was tortured.

Choosing Naji Sabri Al Hadithi as the new foreign minister – instead of deputy foreign minister Nabil Najem Al Takriti, deputy foreign minister Riad Al Kaisi or Iraq’s ambassador in Washington during 1980 and Iraq’s former U.N. representative Nizar Hamdoun- was clearly indicative for the coming months the focus is expected to be on the Palestinian intifada and the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem rather than Iraqi-related issues.

Hussein refrained from referring to his country’s strained ties with the U.N. Security Council during his speech marking the 33rd anniversary of the coup d’etat that brought him to power. He also failed to refer in a clear way to the U.S.-British proposed smart sanctions, saying only “Down with all decisions by the United States, which is the enemy of all peoples.”

Days earlier, Hussein appeared convinced that America and Britain would have to find other “mean ways” of acting against his country because they would fail to impose the new U.S.-sponsored ‘smart sanctions’ formula.

Hussein even expressed readiness to open a direct dialogue with the Kurdish groups that have been controlling northern Iraq since 1991, hinting that he would make concessions if they sever their ties with Washington.

Baghdad does not expect a large-scale U.S. military attack like the December 1998 Desert Fox operation, and it is determined to respond to new sanctions with what Baghdad calls a “policy of challenge.”

The Iraqi government recently hinted that it would treat American and British pilots whose planes could be downed patrolling the no-fly zones as “war criminals.”

Since 1991 U.S. and British planes have patrolled northern and southern Iraq to prevent Iraqi attacks on the Kurds in the north and the Shia Muslims in the south. It is to be recalled that this policy, which was Tariq Aziz’s brainchild, has come to be known as “The Mother of Diplomatic Disasters.”

The new foreign minister has thus made clear that Iraq was “ready to confront all possibilities” while its “military, political and economic performance” was progressing every day. He also reiterated Iraq’s refusal to allow the return of the U.N. disarmament inspectors.

Hussain Hindawi is the editor of United Press International’s London-based Arab News Service.

Commentary: Lawlessness and Iraq’s future

Analysis: Iraqi army no pushover

Analysis: Iraqi opposition still divided

Sept. 11: Backlash for Islamic militants

Commentary: Give Muslims their due

Iraqi dinar rises amid smuggling scandals

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